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PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT RECORDS: 
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PRIVACY 
GRAYSON BARBER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Governmental agencies, including the courts, have a special obligation to 
protect the public’s interest in individual privacy.  Government records and 
court records are being harvested for personal information about individuals, 
contributing to a surge in identity theft, consumer profiling, and the 
development of a stratified society where individuals are pigeonholed 
according to the electronic trail they leave of transactions that disclose personal 
details about them.  Personal information is valuable to commercial interests, 
but the state has no obligation to disclose data about its citizens.  To the 
contrary, the government should protect individuals who disclose information 
about themselves to the state only because they are forced to do so. 
All governments collect and use personal information in order to govern.1  
Government records include data that contain personal information about 
 
* Grayson Barber, a First Amendment litigator and privacy advocate in Princeton, New Jersey, 
wishes to thank those whose insights and essential support have contributed to the work presented 
here: Peter D. Meyers, Frank Askin, Ed Barocas, Thomas J. Cafferty, Fred Cate, Frank Corrado, 
Chris Hoofnagle, Stuart Kaplan, William John Kearns, Jr., Helen Nissenbaum, Daniel Solove, Jay 
Stanley, and Barry Steinhardt. 
 1. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002) (giving an excellent analysis of government records 
and the perils of aggregating individual information). 
States maintain records spanning an individual’s life from birth to death, including 
records of births, marriages, divorces, professional licenses, voting information, worker’s 
compensation, personnel files (for public employees), property ownership, arrests, victims 
of crime, criminal and civil court proceedings, and scores of other [pieces of] 
information. . . ..  These records contain personal information including a person’s 
physical description (age, photograph, height, weight, eye color); race, nationality, and 
gender; family life (children, marital history, divorces, and even intimate details about 
one’s marital relationship); residence, location, and contact information (address, 
telephone number, value and type of property owned, description of one’s home); political 
activity (political party affiliation, contributions to political groups, frequency of voting); 
financial condition (bankruptcies, financial information, salary, debts); employment 
(place of employment, job position, salary, sick leave); criminal history (arrests, 
convictions, traffic citations); health and medical condition (doctors’ reports, 
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individuals.  Many of these records have long been open for public inspection 
for a number of reasons.  Government offices, including the courts, must 
moderate their need to collect information with their obligations to be open to 
the people and simultaneously to protect the privacy of individuals. 
Every individual in this country is compelled to disclose personal 
information to the government.  One has no choice.2  In order to receive 
government services, in order to do business with the government, and in order 
to be a law-abiding citizen, one must provide one’s home address, telephone 
number (listed or unlisted), and much more to the government.  The 
government, therefore, must protect the public interest by maintaining the 
privacy of personal information in government files.3  No commercial entity is 
likely to do so, and individuals rarely have the power to protect their personal 
privacy from commercial pressures to treat personal data as a commodity.4 
The core purpose of open government records statutes is to enhance public 
understanding of the operations and activities of government.5 
Official information that sheds light on a state agency’s performance of its 
statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose.  That purpose, 
however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that 
is accumulated in various governmental files but reveals little or nothing about 
an agency’s own conduct.6 
The government collects a great deal of information about its citizens that, 
if re-disclosed and assembled in a new mosaic, could be exploited to the 
detriment of individual privacy.  States require their citizens to disclose data 
about their personal affairs, including Social Security numbers, medical 
information, financial information and home addresses.7  The government may 
well have important reasons for collecting such information, but, as noted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, “[t]he right to collect and use such data for public 
purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory 
 
psychiatrists’ notes, drug prescriptions, diseases and other disorders); and identifying 
information (mother’s maiden name, Social Security number). This list is far from 
complete. 
Id. at 1139. 
 2. Basic family relationships, for example, such as marriage and divorce, involve obtaining 
licenses and decrees from the executive and judicial branches respectively.  Cf. Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (fundamental constitutional right to marry). 
 3. See Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the public interest in privacy, especially in the home, was sufficient to defeat a First 
Amendment challenge to the “Do-Not-Call” list). 
 4. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995). 
 5. U.S. Dep’t. of Def. v. F.L.R.A., 510 U.S. 487, 495 (1994). 
 6. Id. at 495-96 (citations omitted). 
 7. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). 
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duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. . . . .  In some circumstances that 
duty . . . has roots in the Constitution . . . .”8 
The availability of personal information in government records is exploited 
for commercial and sometimes criminal purposes.  Commercial data 
aggregators routinely mine government records to gather information about 
individuals.9  This practice in turn has been exploited for fraudulent purposes.  
In February 2005, for example, the country’s largest information broker, 
ChoicePoint, unwittingly sold personal information on at least 145,000 
Americans to a criminal ring engaged in identity theft.10  ChoicePoint sent 
letters to residents of California, notifying them of the wrongful disclosure of 
their personal information, but only because California had a state law on the 
books forcing ChoicePoint to take the action.11  In response to a letter from 
thirty-eight state attorney generals, ChoicePoint sent out letters to other 
potential victims of identity theft across the country, but it did not disclose to 
the victims the data it disclosed to the thieves.12  ChoicePoint obtains much of 
its data from government files.13 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Access Denied: The Data Industry May Face New Restriction 
after Privacy Breaches, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), May 20, 2005, at 17. 
 10. Evan Perez & Rich Brooks, File Sharing: For Big Vendor of Personal Data, A Theft 
Lays Bare the Downside, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2005, at A1.  See also Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches Reported Since the ChoicePoint Incident, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2005) (listing a 
chronology of data breaches, which demonstrates that many databases collect and store sensitive 
personal information with inadequate security, including banks, schools, retailers and government 
offices); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Data Security: The Discussion Draft of Data Protection 
Legislation, Testimony & Stmt. for the Record before the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection (Jul. 29, 2005), available 
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/datasec7.28.05.html (discussing some of the motives 
for security breaches, including identity theft, debt collection, extortion, voyeurism, and 
competition). 
 11. After the Breach: How Secure and Accurate is Consumer Information Held by 
ChoicePoint and other Data Aggregators?: Hearing on S.B. 550 Before the Comm. on Banking, 
Finance and Insurance, Cal. Senate, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 30, 2005) (testimony of Dan 
McGuffey, Vice President, Data Acquisition and Strategy, ChoicePoint Services, Inc.), available 
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cp3.30.05.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).  The title 
of the hearing can be found at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0501-
0550/sb_550_cfa_20050504_153527_sen_comm.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
 12. 38 AGs Send Open Letter to ChoicePoint, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/infotheft/2005-02-19-ag-letter-to-
choicepoint_x.htm. 
 13. After the Breach: How Secure and Accurate is Consumer Information Held by 
ChoicePoint and other Data Aggregators?: Hearing on S.B. 550 Before the Comm. On Banking, 
Finance and Insurance, Cal. Senate, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 30, 2005) (testimony of Chris Jay 
Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center), available at http://72.14.203.104/ 
search?q=cache:irwkp5EPpBoJ:www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).  
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Reed Elsevier, the Anglo-Dutch publishing giant, similarly reported in 
April 2005 that unauthorized people using customer passwords of its 
subsidiary, Seisint, may have gained access to the personal information of up 
to 310,000 people in the United States.14  Seisint and Lexis-Nexis (Reed 
Elsevier’s legal department) often obtain data from government records.15 
Since the ChoicePoint breach was first reported, scores of similar breaches 
have been reported, affecting the personal information of millions of 
individuals.16  These breaches reflect a failure of self-regulation on the part of 
the commercial entities that collect, store, and sell personal information. 
A recent report described the ease with which government records may be 
combined to create dossiers on citizens.17  Computer scientists at Johns 
Hopkins University replicated the methods of companies like ChoicePoint by 
linking databases such as death records, property tax information, campaign 
donations, and occupational license registries.18  For less than $50 it was 
possible to enter a single name and generate multiple layers of information on 
individuals, including home address, phone number, occupation, birth dates, 
and family details. 19 
The question arises, therefore, as to whether the government should take 
steps to withhold sensitive personal information from disclosure on the 
Internet.  The companies that turn a profit from collecting and then selling such 
 
The title of the hearing can be found at  http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb_550 
_cfa_20050504_153527_sen_comm.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
 14. Kirchgaessner, supra note 9, at 17. 
[T]he Financial Times obtained a comprehensive report on one individual generated by 
Seisint’s Accurint database.  It included the person’s Social Security number[,] . . . . . . 
political party affiliation, date of birth, every address at which the person had lived within 
the U.S., the names and birth dates of some neighbours . . . . . . and details of a property 
sale. . . . 
  The report also included the names, previous and current addresses and telephone 
numbers of the individual’s immediate family members; the first five digits of the family 
members’ Social Security numbers; the names and birthdates of their neighbours; and 
“neighbourhood profiles” - the average age of residents in the neighbourhood, the average 
number of years of education, the median household income and the median home value. 
  Accurint also offered information on whether the individual had any registered motor 
vehicles or merchant vessels; whether they were certified by the Federal Aviation 
Administration; whether they had a criminal record or had committed any sexual 
offences; or whether they owned a hunting or fishing permit or a permit to hold a 
concealed weapon. 
Id. 
 15. Heather Timmons, Reed Elsevier Raises Toll for Data Theft at LexisNexis Unit, 
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 14, 2005, at 16, available at http:www.westlaw.com. 
 16. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 10. 
 17. Tom Zeller, Jr., Personal Data for the Taking: Students Surfing Public Records Learn 
It’s Easy to Find Out a Lot, NEW YORK TIMES, May 18, 2005, at A1. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT RECORDS 67 
information, often through open government records requests, have lobbied 
forcefully to ensure that public sources of private information remain open.20  
This article, by contrast, makes the case that state actors have an obligation to 
protect confidential personal information from unwarranted disclosure. 
Part I of this article describes the kinds of personal information collected, 
stored, and disclosed by government offices, including the courts, and 
describes the principles of fair information practices that should be brought to 
bear upon the release of personal information to commercial data brokers.  Part 
II explicates the tensions between privacy and disclosure, using the specific 
examples of home address information and a heated debate before a state 
privacy study commission in New Jersey.  Part III asks whether a “right to 
information privacy” can survive in the digital age, examining the 
constitutional, statutory, and normative arguments for and against disclosure of 
personal information in government files.  Part IV discusses the eroding 
distinction between government and commercial databases and implications 
for civil liberties.  Part V offers policy recommendations to protect public 
interest in privacy. 
I.  PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT RECORDS 
To withstand the profit imperative, individuals in the United States are 
protected by a patchwork of narrow privacy statutes.  One’s video rental 
records, for example, are amply protected by federal law,21 but one’s health 
records may be disclosed for marketing purposes.22  The privacy interests of a 
single individual are rarely strong enough to prevail against countervailing 
commercial interests, but most Americans sense they are entitled to a measure 
 
 20. The leading advocate for keeping public records open to data mining companies is the 
Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access (“CSPRA”).  Members of CSPRA include Acxiom 
Corporation, Donnelly Marketing, The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, Equifax Inc., Experian, 
First American Real Estate Solutions, Lexis Nexis, The Polk Company, and Trans Union.  Fred 
H. Cate & Richard J. Varn, The Public Record, Information Privacy and Access: A New 
Framework for Finding the Balance, http://www.netcaucus.org/books/privacy2001/pdf/ 
Limitsofoptin.pdf.  Ironically, CSPRA appears to have taken down its website, at least 
temporarily (www.cspra.org/csprasite/).  Some of its activities are described in a white paper at 
http://www.netcaucus.org/books/privacy2001/pdf/Limitsofoptin.pdf. 
  For more information on lobbying efforts by the Newspaper Association of America, the 
Society of Professional Journalists, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the 
Associated Press, and the American Society of Newspaper Editors, see Jonathan Kaplan, The 
Freedom of Information Center: Advocates for Journalists May Take Agenda to K Street, THE 
HILL, Feb. 10, 2005, available at http://foi.missouri.edu/firstamendment/advforjs.html.  See also 
Tom Zeller, Jr., The Scramble to Protect Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 9, 2005, at C1. 
 21. Video Protection Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000). 
 22. See HIPAA Privacy Act, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500(a), 164.501 (defining marketing), 
164.508(a)(3), 164.512(b)(1)(iii)(D) (2005). 
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of privacy that goes above and beyond the claims that are recognized by tort 
law.23 
A. Open Government Records Statutes 
Open government records are essential for a functioning democracy, 
allowing citizens to understand and evaluate the inner workings of state and 
local government.  Open government records are also a valuable tool for 
protecting individuals from governmental intrusion into personal privacy.  
Privacy advocates often use the Freedom of Information Act and other open 
government records statutes to limit governmental intrusion into the private 
lives of individuals.24 
 
 23. The tort of invasion of privacy was first proposed by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel 
D.Warren in The Right to Privacy, 4 HARVARD L. REV. 193 (1890).  This tort differs substantially 
in its origins from the line of cases following the constitutional right to information privacy and 
FOIA-type statutes.  See, e.g., Kinsella v. Welch, 827 A.2d 325, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003) (“A crucial distinction between the constitutional right of privacy and its common law 
namesake is that the common law right operates as a control on private behavior, while the 
constitutional right operates as a control on government.  The two rights are necessarily different 
because our concept of appropriate behavior for private persons and government officials is 
different.”).  Open government records statutes apply to state action, and the tort applies to 
commercial or other non-governmental actors.  See generally Understanding the Federal Courts: 
The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
1999, at 7-10, http://www.uscourts.gov/UFC99.pdf; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980).  Legally 
recognized privacy interests have been aptly described as a haystack in a hurricane; examples of 
privacy invasions abound, yet they often defy systematic labeling.  Ettore v. Philco Television 
Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956).  The Second Restatement of Torts adopted 
Prosser’s classic system of categorizing four different kinds of privacy invasions: 1) intrusion 
(e.g., hidden videotape cameras); 2) appropriation (e.g., commercial use of name or likeness); 3) 
false light (from which spring, for example, disclaimers on motion pictures, denying any 
resemblance to persons living or dead); and 4) public disclosure of private facts (e.g., disclosing 
privileged communications).  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).  This system of 
categorization has operated as both a blessing and a curse.  The categories have allowed litigants 
to recover for some kinds of invasions, but have seriously limited those who fall outside the 
parameters of the four compartments.  Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ginsberg, 351 F.3d 473, 479-81 
(11th Cir. 2003) (refusing to extend the invasion of privacy to include unwelcome touching in a 
sexual manner). 
 24. See Solove, supra note 1.  Personal information, including home addresses and telephone 
numbers, may be obtained from state government records without using open government records 
statutes as the avenue for submitting the request.  Id. at 1143-45.  The courts remain another 
avenue for obtaining non-public government records.  Id. at 1156  .  A common law right exists in 
most states to inspect government records so long as the requestor has a good reason to inspect 
the records, and the requestor’s reasons for inspecting the records outweigh the state’s interest in 
confidentiality.  Id.  A substantial body of case law generally provides broader access to 
government records, but requires a judicial balancing test.  In many jurisdictions, however, the 
common law right of access to government records permits the state to inquire into the 
requestor’s reasons for seeking governmental records.  Id. at 1158. 
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Federal offices are governed by two companion statutes: the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”), and the Privacy Act of 1974 (“Privacy Act”), both 
of which pertain to the disclosure of information about individual citizens.25  
The presumption behind FOIA is that government records belong to the people 
and should be disclosed unless they fall within one of nine specific 
categories.26  The Privacy Act creates a presumption that if a government 
record pertains to an individual citizen, it should not be disclosed unless certain 
specific exceptions apply.27 
As discussed in the New Jersey Privacy Study Commission Report,28 when 
Congress considered these measures in the early 1970s, the United States 
Privacy Protection Study Commission articulated a set of fair information 
practices to limit the government’s use of personally identifiable information.29  
These principles provide guidelines to limit the collection, use, disclosure, 
retention, and disposal of personal information by the government, and they 
have become widely accepted.30  The following principles of fair information 
practices have become the foundation for many privacy laws and codes of 
practice around the world: 
Collection limitation.  There should be limits to the collection of personal 
data.  Any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where 
appropriate, with the knowledge and consent of the data subject. 
Data Quality.  Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which 
the data are gathered and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be 
accurate, complete, and kept up-to-date. 
Purpose Specification.  The purposes for which personal data are collected 
should be specified no later than the time of data collection, and the subsequent 
use should be limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are 
not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of 
change of purpose. 
 
 25. The Freedom of Information Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C § 552 (2002); The Privacy Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552a (2004). 
 26. The exemptions are for (1) national security; (2) internal agency rules; (3) other statutes; 
(4) business information; (5) internal government memos; (6) private matters; (7) law 
enforcement investigations; (8) regulation of financial institutions; and (9) oil wells.  5 U.S.C. § 
552(b). 
 27. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
 28. See SPECIAL DIRECTIVE SUBCOMM., N.J. PRIVACY STUDY COMM’N, DRAFT OF THE 
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL DIRECTIVE SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE NEW JERSEY PRIVACY STUDY 
COMMISSION 17 (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.nj.gov/privacy/eo26.pdf. 
 29. See PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY: REPORT OF THE PRIVACY 
PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report. 
 30. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (permissible purposes of 
consumer reports); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (fair information practices for 
personally identifiable information). 
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Use Limitation.  Personal data should not be disclosed, made available, or 
otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with the 
purpose specification principle except with the consent of the data subject or 
by the authority of law. 
Security Safeguards.  Personal data should be protected by reasonable 
security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, 
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure of data. 
Openness.  There should be a general policy of openness about 
developments, practices, and policies with respect to personal data.  Means 
should be readily available for establishing the existence and nature of personal 
data and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual 
residence of the data custodian. 
Individual Participation.  An individual should have the right: 
(a) to obtain from a data custodian confirmation of whether or not the data 
custodian has data relating to him; 
(b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him (i) within a 
reasonable time; (ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; (iii) in a 
reasonable manner; and (iv) in a form that is readily intelligible to him; 
(c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is 
denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and 
(d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful, to 
have the data erased, rectified, completed, or amended. 
Accountability.  A data custodian should be accountable for complying 
with measures that give effect to the principles stated above.31 
The United States Privacy Protection Study Commission recognized that 
“[t]he real danger is the gradual erosion of individual liberties through the 
automation, integration and interconnection of many small, separate record-
keeping systems, each of which alone may seem innocuous, even benevolent, 
and wholly justifiable.”32  The Internet has realized this prediction.  Indeed, 
credit card companies, financial institutions, and government agencies share or 
 
 31. New Jersey Information Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:23A-1 (1985) (governs 
HMOs and other insurance entities); Canada Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21 (1985).  Every state in 
the European Union has adopted fair information practices as law.  See Council Directive 
95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281), 31-51 (EC) (Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
of Ministers of the European Commission on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data); THE ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), OECD GUIDELINES ON THE 
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (2005), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 32. U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN 
INFORMATION SOCIETY Ch. 13 (1977), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/ 
c13.htm. 
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sell personal information unless the affected individuals take affirmative steps 
to demand that their records not be disclosed.33 
As presently constituted, many state open government records statutes 
threaten to expose individual citizens to greater invasions of privacy, not by 
government, but by commercial enterprise.34  Many requests for government 
records come not from watchdog groups, the press, or private citizens, but 
from data mining companies that glean personal information from 
governmental records for the purpose of creating “profiles” or dossiers on 
individuals.35 
B. Court Records 
Courthouse records, similarly, are mined and harvested for personally 
identifiable information.  Court records often contain information that is 
exquisitely personal, such as: 
- Social Security numbers; 
- income and business tax returns; 
- information provided or exchanged by the parties in child support 
enforcement actions; 
- home addresses of litigants, witnesses and jurors; 
- photographs depicting violence, death, or children subjected to abuse; 
- name, address, or telephone number of victims, including sexual assault 
and domestic violence cases; 
- names, addresses, and telephone numbers of witnesses in criminal 
cases; 
- names, addresses ,and telephone numbers of informants in criminal 
cases; 
- names, addresses, or telephone numbers of potential or sworn jurors in 
criminal cases; 
- juror questionnaires and transcripts of voir dire of prospective jurors; 
- medical or mental health records, including examination, diagnosis, 
evaluation, or treatment records; 
 
 33. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Pub.L. No. 106-102, 15 USC, Subchapter I, Sec. 6801-6809 
(1999) (financial institutions may sell or disclose personal financial records unless the individual 
“opts-out”).  See http://www.zabasearch.com for an example of a website that obtains unlisted 
telephone numbers from government records and makes them freely available online.   
 34. Different states vary considerably in their approaches to providing access to government 
records.  See Solove, supra note 1, at 1163. 
 35. The federal Government Accountability Office defines “data mining” as “the application 
of database technology and techniques – such as statistical analysis and modeling – to uncover 
hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of 
future results.”  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A 
WIDE RANGE OF USES 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf. 
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- psychological evaluations of parties, for example regarding competency 
to stand trial; 
-  child custody evaluations in family law or abuse and neglect actions; 
- information related to the performance, conduct, or discipline of 
judicial officers; 
- information related to alleged misconduct by entities or individuals 
licensed or regulated by the judiciary; 
- trade secrets and other intellectual property.36 
The personal information taken from government records is often not used 
for its intended purpose but instead purchased and sold for purposes totally 
unrelated to government mandates.37  Citizens are compelled to disclose 
information about themselves to the courts, but their information may be 
mined and sold for a profit.38  Nor is the information used for purposes that 
benefit the individual. 
These court records can be used to create an underclass of people who 
cannot get jobs, rent apartments, or obtain credit.  For example, data mining 
companies that perform employee background checks keep permanent records 
of arrests and criminal sentences.39  Once recorded in commercial databases, 
these records cannot be corrected or expunged, even if the arrests never led to 
conviction or if the data become stale and irrelevant.40  Currently, African-
Americans are disproportionately represented in the vulnerable population of 
people who have such records.41 
The courts and state and local government agencies must not disregard the 
consequences of publishing these records.  State actors have no obligation to 
help data mining companies make a profit.  However, state and local 
government agencies do have an obligation to protect the public interest in 
privacy.  This can be done without compromising the spirit and purpose of 
open government records legislation, which is to shed light on government 
operations. 
 
 36. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1145-48. 
 37. Id. at 1194-95. 
 38. See id. at 1145, 1149-50, 1152. 
 39. See, e.g., Jennifer Bayot, Use of Credit Records Grows in Screening Job Applicants, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2004.  See also, Solove, supra note 1, at 1152 (explaining that an 
anonymous woman was terminated from her job after a background check erroneously indicated a 
past drug conviction). 
 40. Congress has elicited comments on the Attorney General’s report on Criminal Records 
and Employment Screening (OLP Docket No. 100).  See Government in the Sunshine Act 
Meeting Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 32,849 (June 6, 2005); Groups Warn of Privacy Risks in 
Employment Screening, August 8, 2005, available at www.privacyrights.org/ar/DOJbackgrd.htm.  
See also Kim Zetter, Bad Data Fouls Background Checks, WIRED, March 11, 2005, 
www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,66856,00.html. 
 41. See EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT SCORES AND CREDIT REPORTS: HOW THE SYSTEM 
REALLY WORKS WHAT YOU CAN DO 235 (2004). 
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II.  THE STATE HAS AN OBLIGATION TO PROTECT CITIZENS 
Confidence in government at all levels is best sustained by access to the 
information necessary to promote the vigorous public discussion that a well-
functioning democracy requires.  However, when dealing with information that 
individuals reasonably expect to remain private and to not be published by the 
government, there should be a presumption that such information will remain 
confidential unless there is an overriding justification for its disclosure. 
To that end, the state should confer special protection for four categories of 
information: home address, Social Security Number, medical information and 
financial information.42  The privacy value of the Social Security Number is 
well known,43 and there is widespread support for keeping medical and 
financial records confidential.44  To illustrate the tension between privacy and 
disclosure and to explicate the constitutional and statutory limits on publication 
by the government, one highly controversial data item provokes heated debate: 
the home address.45 
Home address information is avidly sought by commercial data 
aggregators and avidly protected by a comparatively small population of 
individuals who seek confidentiality and sometimes protection.46  The 
government’s obligation to protect or disclose home address information is 
subject to constitutional, statutory, common law, and normative limits. 
A. Home Address Information 
Home addresses poignantly illustrate the debate about whether state 
agencies should disclose personal information about citizens pursuant to open 
 
 42. See infra p. 27 and nn. 320 & 330 for the proposition that two exceptions should apply to 
home address: voter registration records and tax assessment records should remain public, 
whereas all other home address records should remain confidential.  See infra nn. 328-31 and 
accompanying text for the proposition that one exception should apply as to financial records: the 
salaries of public employees. 
 43. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS: PRIVATE SECTOR 
ENTITIES ROUTINELY OBTAIN AND USE SSNS, AND LAWS LIMIT THE DISCLOSURE OF THIS 
INFORMATION, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0411.pdf. 
 44. See U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN 
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977), available at http:/ www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report.   
 45. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (rejecting argument 
that vendors have a right under the Constitution to send unsolicited mail into another’s home); 
Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that plaintiffs argued that the 
law infringed their constitutionally protected privacy interest by disseminating their home 
address). 
 46. See, e.g., National Network to End Domestic Violence, Public & Internet Access to 
Court Records: Safety & Privacy Risks for Victims of Domestic Violence & All Citizens Using the 
Justice System, available at www.ischool.washington.edu/lawsymposium/docs/CourtRecordsand 
Victims.pdf; Solove, supra note 1, at 1138-40.  
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government records requests.  On one side, data aggregators and journalists 
argue that home address is a valuable identifier that should always be in the 
public domain.47  On the other, privacy advocates and many individuals argue 
that the state should not be in the business of disclosing personally identifiable 
information.48 
Citizens disclose their home addresses because they are compelled to do so 
by state law and in order to receive basic governmental services.49  Since they 
have no choice but to give their home addresses to the government, they 
should reasonably expect that the government will not re-disclose their 
addresses to unknown third parties.  As explained below, there exists a right to 
privacy in one’s home address, under the United States Constitution, some 
state constitutions, and by statute.50 
i. Special Status of the Home.  “The home has long enjoyed significant 
legal protection as a private place.”51  The maxim that “a man’s home is his 
castle” appeared as early as 1499.52  Parliamentarian William Pitt wrote, “The 
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.  It 
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may 
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter – all his force 
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!”53  The Supreme Court 
recognized in 1886 the importance of protecting “the sanctity of a man’s 
home.”54  “In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when 
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s 
home . . . .”55 
The home enjoys a special status as refuge from intrusions by the state and 
commercial enterprise.56  One of the most famous formulations of the right to 
 
 47. Compare Solove, supra note 1, at 1149, with Fred H. Cate & Richard J. Varn, The Public 
Record, Information Privacy and Access: A New Framework for Finding the Balance, 
http://it.ojp.gov/initiatives/files/Public_Record.pdf. 
 48. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, 
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, GOVERNMENT BENEFITS FROM SSN USE, BUT COULD PROVIDE 
BETTER SAFEGUARDS, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/d02352.pdf.   
 49. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1143-44. 
 50. See infra Part I.A.i-iii. 
 51. MARC ROTENBERG & DANIEL J. SOLOVE, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 585 (2003). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 & n.7 (1958) (quoting William Pitt’s 
speech before Parliament in 1763). 
 54. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 55. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980). 
 56. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (rejecting the 
argument that a vendor has a Constitutional right to send unwanted material into the home of 
another); Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that governmental interest is sufficient to defeat First Amendment challenge to “do-not-call” 
registry); F.L.R.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that the 
disclosure of an individual’s home address infringes upon a recognized privacy interest); 
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privacy calls it “the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men.”57  In Rowan v. United States Post 
Office, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the “right to be let alone” in one’s 
home requires upholding, against First Amendment challenges, the rights of 
homeowners to take their names and addresses off various mailing lists: 
We . . . categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the 
Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of 
another. . . .  That we are often “captives” outside the sanctuary of the home 
and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be 
captives everywhere. . . .  The asserted right of a mailer, we repeat, stops at the 
outer boundary of every person’s domain.”58 
Rowan places the right to be let alone in one’s home “in the scales” with 
the constitutionally protected rights of others to communicate.59 
ii.  Federal Constitutional Protection for Home Address Information.  The 
United States Constitution explicitly protects the home as a refuge from 
governmental action, including dissemination of personal information.  The 
Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects . . .[,]”60 the Third Amendment protects the 
home from military use,61 and the First Amendment protects free expression in 
the home.62  The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
specifically protects private conduct in the home.63 
The United States Supreme Court defined a distinct constitutional right to 
“information privacy” in Whalen v. Roe, which addressed the constitutionality 
of a state law that required physicians to report patients who obtained certain 
kinds of prescription drugs.64  The Court held that the right to privacy 
embraced both (i) an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters” and (ii) an “interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
 
F.L.R.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that federal 
employees have privacy interests in their home addresses); N.A.R.F.E. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 
879 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding there was no public interest in the disclosure of addresses of 
individuals receiving federal employee retirement benefits). 
 57. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 58. 397 U.S. at 738 (citations omitted). 
 59. Id. at 736. 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 62. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 63. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003).  Many Supreme Court 
cases make the point in a variety of contexts that the home is the last refuge of privacy.  See, e.g., 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-31 (2001) (thermal imaging); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
474, 483-85 (1988) (residential picketing); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) 
(broadcast media). 
 64. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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important decisions.”65  Interpreting this right to information privacy, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that case law 
“reflect[s] the general understanding that home addresses are entitled to some 
privacy protection, whether or not so required by a statute.”66 
iii.  Statutory Protection for Home Address Information: FOIA and the 
Privacy Act.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, there exists a substantial 
privacy interest in home address information.67  This interest is expressed, in 
part, through legislation, of which the best current example is the Privacy Act, 
which Congress enacted as a companion statute to the FOIA.68 
The FOIA was enacted in 1966 and amended in 1974.69 FOIA creates 
procedures whereby any member of the public may obtain records of the 
agencies of the federal government.70  It has served as the model for most open 
government records statutes in the states.71 
Although the goal of FOIA is full disclosure of government records, 
Congress concluded that some confidentiality would be necessary for the 
government to function.72  A federal agency may refuse to release certain types 
of information.73  There are nine legal categories that are exempted from FOIA 
under section 552(b) of the law.74  One of the exemptions is for “private 
matters;”75 another is for other statutes, including the Privacy Act.76 
The Privacy Act permits individuals to obtain their own records, gives 
them the right to correct, amend, or delete information about themselves, and 
gives them the right to sue federal agencies if they refuse to correct or amend 
the records.77  The Privacy Act creates a default presumption that records 
regarding personal individuals will not be disclosed.78 
Reading FOIA and the Privacy Act together, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
said that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to their 
 
 65. Id. at 599-600, 604-05. 
 66. Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 67. U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. F.L.R.A., 510 U.S. 487, 502 (1994) (interpreting the Freedom of 
Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974). 
 68. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2005). 
 69. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2005). 
 70. § 552(a)(1). 
 71. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1161. 
 72. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
 73. § 552(b). 
 74. For a list of the nine exceptions, see supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 75. § 552(b)(6). 
 76. § 552(b)(3). 
 77. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2005).  This is consistent with the principles of fair information 
practices.  See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
 78. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2005). 
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home addresses.79  In United States Department of Defense v. Fair Labor 
Relations Authority, the Court explained: 
It is true that home addresses often are publicly available through sources such 
as telephone directories and voter registration lists, but in an organized society, 
there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another. . . . 
 . . . .An individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination of information 
regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information 
may be available to the public in some form. . . . . . . . .  We are reluctant to 
disparage the privacy of the home, which is accorded special consideration in 
our Constitution, laws, and traditions.80 
This is consistent with ordinary experience.  Many people have a 
reasonable expectation that their home addresses will be private.  These 
include children and people who have made a genuine effort to keep their 
home address information private by getting an unlisted telephone number or 
asking to be removed from mailing lists.  Other groups of people often seek 
protection of their home address information: celebrities, domestic violence 
victims, stalking victims, witnesses in criminal cases, abortion doctors, and 
police officers. 
If one does not want one’s residence to be known, the importance of its 
being unknown goes to the core of individual privacy.  People who do not want 
the government to disclose their home addresses have limited means for 
preventing disclosure and little recourse once the disclosure has been made.  
The government should not force individuals to sacrifice their privacy as a 
condition of doing business.81  Indeed, if a state were routinely to give out 
home addresses, it would be at peril not only of violating the Constitution, but 
it would also repudiate the privacy protections of the federal FOIA approach, 
which is the approach on which most state open government records statutes 
are modeled.82 
In Forest Guardians v. U.S. FEMA, the Tenth Circuit affirmed privacy for 
geographic information systems (“GIS”), finding that disclosure would invade 
privacy by giving away the location of residential structures in New Mexico’s 
flood plains.83  The court found there was no public interest in disclosure.84 
 
 79. U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 502 (1994). 
 80. Id. at 500-01 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 81. Some states allow victims of domestic violence to use an alternate address for all state 
and local governmental purposes, including driver’s licenses and registration, professional 
licensing, banking and insurance records, welfare, etc.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:4-1 
(1998).  New Jersey laws also enable victims of domestic violence to vote without revealing their 
addresses.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:31-3.2 (2001).  Victims of sexual assault and stalking may use 
an alternate address on their driver’s license and registration.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-4 (2004). 
 82. See, e.g., McClain v. Coll. Hospital, 492 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 1985). 
 83. 410 F.3d 1214, 1216-19 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 84. Id. at 1219. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
78 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:63 
The Forest Guardians, an environmental group, asked for the information 
in order to show that FEMA was promoting overdevelopment in flood plains.85  
FEMA released the information in paper form, but declined to disclose its GIS 
files.86  The court held that “[i]n the context of an individual residence, ‘the 
privacy interest of an individual in avoiding the unlimited disclosure of his or 
her name and address is significant. . . . . . . . .”87 
The type of privacy interests Congress intended to protect under Exemption 6 
[of FOIA] encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or 
her person.  Such private information includes, for example, an individual’s 
name and home address.  The privacy interest in an individual’s home address 
becomes even more substantial when that information would be coupled with 
personal financial information.  In this case, the electronic GIS files are exempt 
from disclosure under Exemption 6 . . . [as they] reveal specific geographic 
point locations for NFIP [“National Flood Insurance Program”] insured 
structures.  Such information, coupled with property records, can lead to, 
among other things, the names and addresses of individual property owners 
and thus applies to particular individuals.88 
The court found commercial solicitation to be sufficiently intrusive to invoke 
governmental protection.89 
NFIP policyholders have a privacy interest – the extent of which we need not 
quantify today. . . . . . . . .  Furthermore, disclosure of the electronic GIS files 
and, the concomitant disclosure of personal information, could subject 
individuals to unwanted contacts or solicitation by private insurance 
companies.  Given the commercial interests involved in the NFIP and, the 
large-scale participation by the private insurance industry, a palpable threat 
exists that disclosing information that could reveal names, home addresses, and 
other personal insurance policy information could lead to an influx of 
unwanted and unsolicited mail, if not more.90 
B. One Local Debate: The New Jersey Privacy Study Commission 
Debating authorities and interest groups engaged in vigorous dispute over 
access to home address information before a state commission in New Jersey.  
The New Jersey Privacy Study Commission91 was convened for the purpose of 
 
 85. Id. at 1216. 
 86. Id. at 1217. 
 87. Id. at 1220 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 35 (D.C. Cir. 
2002)). 
 88. Forest Guardians, 410 F.3d at 1218 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 89. Id. at 1221. 
 90. Id. at 1220-21 (citations omitted). 
 91. The New Jersey Privacy Study Commission, on which the author served, was ably 
staffed by Catherine Starghill and the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs.  State of 
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exploring the impact of the state’s new open government records statute, the 
Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”).92  New Jersey had gone from having one 
of the most restrictive FOIA-type statutes, to having one of the most open.93  
Under a special directive from the governor, the Privacy Study Commission 
grappled specifically with the issue of home addresses, generating considerable 
controversy.94  Over the course of a year and a half, the Privacy Study 
Commission elicited testimony from scores of witnesses, who argued for and 
against the disclosure of home address information from state and local 
government files.95 
i.  Arguments Against Disclosure of Home Address Information.  The most 
common argument against disclosing home address and telephone information 
is “When I give my home address to the government I don’t want the 
government to give it to anyone else.”96  The National Network to End 
Domestic Violence, for example, criticized the practice of publishing domestic 
violence, sexual assault, and family law cases on the Internet.97  The New 
Jersey Coalition for Battered Women submitted a written statement strongly 
opposing the disclosure of names, addresses, phone numbers, and personal 
information to the general public.98  “No victim of domestic violence should be 
impeded in her or his efforts to remain safe from a batterer by the unmonitored 
disclosure of their contact information by the government.”99 
An expert on privacy and government records, Professor Daniel J. 
Solove,100 provided written testimony to the Commission, taking the position 
that governmental disclosure of home address information might in some 
instances violate the federal or state constitution.101  To disclose home 
 
New Jersey Privacy Study Commission, Commission Members and Staff, http://www.nj.gov/ 
privacy/members.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). 
 92. State of New Jersey Privacy Study Commission, http://www.nj.gov/privacy (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2005).  For the full text of the Open Public Records Act, including the charge to the 
Privacy Study Commission, see Open Public Records Act, http://www.state.nj.us/grc/act.html. 
 93. See 1963 N.J. Laws 223; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 (2005). 
 94. Exec. Order No. 26, State of New Jersey, Aug. 13, 2002, available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eom26.shtml. 
 95. N.J. PRIVACY STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: N.J. PRIVACY COMMISSION 15 
(Dec. 2004), available at http://www.nj.gov/privacy/prc_final_report_v21.pdf (last visited Nov. 
18, 2005) [hereinafter N.J. PRIVACY REPORT]. 
 96. Id. at 18. 
 97. Testimony before the Privacy Study Commission is on file with the author and at the 
New Jersey Department of Community Affairs.  See National Network to End Domestic 
Violence, supra note 46. 
 98. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 27. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Daniel J. Solove is an associate professor of law at George Washington University Law 
School.  The George Washington University Law School, Daniel J. Solove, 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove (last visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
 101. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 24. 
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addresses and telephone numbers under open government records statutes, he 
explained, would constitute a departure from the federal approach under the 
FOIA102 and could potentially be unconstitutional.103  There are several groups 
of people who have a strong interest in keeping their home addresses 
confidential, and ample case law from federal and state courts recognizes a 
state interest in preserving residential privacy.104  Professor Solove emphasized 
the following points: 
1. There are very compelling reasons why people want their addresses and 
phone numbers to remain private. 
2. The addresses and phone numbers in public records are often not 
acquired by the government voluntarily.  People are compelled to 
supply this information.  Without privacy protection for this 
information, what the state would be doing is compelling people to 
divulge information to the public that they may want to remain 
confidential. 
3. The Third Circuit case law, which governs in New Jersey, has 
recognized that there is a constitutional interest in the nondisclosure of 
personal information.105  The government has the burden of justifying 
why it needs to disclose certain personal information and why that 
disclosure outweighs people’s privacy interests. 
4. This issue is too important and complex for absolute rules.  An 
appropriate solution must balance the interests on both sides and take 
into account that many people have compelling safety reasons for not 
disclosing their addresses and phone numbers. 
5. The primary purpose for public access to government records is to 
enable the people to learn about how their government functions.  
Government records are not supposed to be a way to spy on citizens or 
find out the personal information they would like to keep confidential.  
These aims satisfy private interests, not public ones.106 
 
 102. Professor Solove authored a casebook entitled INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, and has 
written extensively on the subject.  See generally ROTENBERG & SOLOVE, supra note 51; DANIEL 
J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
(2004).  His written testimony, and all written testimony received by the New Jersey Privacy 
Study Commission, is posted on the Commission’s web site.  See N.J. Privacy Study 
Commission, www.nj.gov/privacy/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
 103. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 24. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See A.A. v. N.J., 341 F.3d 206, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2003); Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98, 
99, 101 (3d Cir. 2000); Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 1999); Doe v. Poritz, 662 
A.2d 367, 408-09 (N.J. 1995). 
 106. See N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 24-25. 
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According to Professor Solove: 
It is important to note that the personal information in public records is often 
compelled by the government.  People don’t give it out freely but are often 
forced to do so.  Broad disclosure of people’s addresses can compromise 
people’s safety.  It may benefit the media, which wants easy access to 
information, and commercial interests, which want to use addresses for 
marketing purposes.  But in balancing under the Constitution, courts look to 
the extent to which the greater public interest is served by disclosure.107 
ii. Arguments in Favor of Disclosing Home Address Information.  The 
Privacy Study Commission received several comments articulating the view 
that no privacy interest should attach to data if the data can be found anywhere 
in the public domain.108  Therefore, they argue, such data should be available 
from the state through requests for open government records.109  This view is 
consistent with much case law.110  It is also consistent with Fourth Amendment 
search-and-seizure law; the United States Supreme Court has held that unless a 
matter is kept secret, it enjoys no “reasonable expectation of privacy.”111  For 
example, although the Court has found a reasonable expectation of privacy 
within the four walls of the home,112 it found no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in sealed, opaque garbage bags discarded by the curb.113 
Professor Fred H. Cate told the Privacy Study Commission “that no 
constitutional privacy right attaches to home addresses and home telephone 
numbers.”114 In his view, “the constitution does not prohibit public access to 
home addresses . . . in government records.”115  Indeed, “he stated that the 
Constitution permits and even encourages public access to such 
information.”116 
 
 107. Id. at 25. 
 108. Id. at 42. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Public Records § 107 (2005) (“The right of privacy is not 
infringed by the publication of matters of public record.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). 
 112. See, e.g., Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 113. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988). 
 114. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 28.  Professor Cate is a professor at Indiana 
University School of Law-Bloomington, Indiana.  Id. at 28 n.29.  His research and his trip to New 
Jersey were supported by the Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access, a not-for-profit group 
funded by businesses that “aggregate and enhance public records for public use.”  Statement on 
the Constitutionality of the Disclosure of Name and Address Information from Public Records: 
Hearing on Address and Telephone Information in Public Records, N.J. Privacy Study 
Commission 1 (2003) (statement of Fred Cate, Professor, Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington), http://www.law.indiana.edu/people/cate/Testimony/Cate.New%20Jersey.pdf 
[hereinafter Cate Statement]. 
 115. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 28. 
 116. Id. 
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According to Professor Cate, “there is no right to privacy guaranteed by 
the Constitution that would speak in any way to the government’s disclosure of 
home address” information.117  He testified that no court has found a 
constitutional right of privacy with respect to information such as home 
address.118  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for 
example, struck down the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, stating that “neither 
the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found a constitutional right to 
privacy with respect to the type of information found in motor vehicle records.  
Indeed, this is the very sort of information to which individuals do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”119  The case, Condon v. Reno, was 
reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds.120 
Professor Cate stated that only one U.S. Supreme Court case, Whalen v. 
Roe, has articulated a constitutional right in the nondisclosure of information, 
and that it did so in the context of nondisclosure to the government, rather than 
any obligation of nondisclosure by the government.121  He further stated that 
the U.S. Supreme Court had never decided a case in which it found that 
disclosure to or by the government violated the constitutional right recognized 
in Whalen.122  He cited U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC,123 for the proposition that if 
government agencies decline to publish information, the agencies should have 
the burden to show that dissemination of the information would inflict specific 
and significant harm on individuals.124 
Professor Cate acknowledged that the government legally owes a higher 
obligation to individual citizens than do private companies of nonprofit 
groups.125  For constitutional and practical reasons, pertaining to the Fourth 
Amendment and the non-competitive environment in which it operates, the 
government has a higher obligation with regard to its own collection and use of 
information.126  He supported the proposition that certain categories of 
information might be exempt from disclosure.127  In certain circumstances, for 
example, involving undercover police officers and people protected by 
restraining orders, he said, “it would be reasonable to conclude that despite the 
 
 117. Id. at 29. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 120. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). 
 121. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 29. 
 122. Id. 
 123. 182 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 124. N.J. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 95, at 29.  As to this standard, see infra notes 156-60 
and accompanying text. 
 125. Home Addresses and Telephone Numbers in Government Records: Public Hearing, N.J. 
Privacy Study Commission 87 (2003) (testimony of Fred Cate, Professor, Indiana University 
School of Law-Bloomington), www.nj.gov/privacy/ph_111203.pdf [hereinafter Cate Testimony]. 
 126. Id. at 88. 
 127. Cate Statement, supra note 114, at 7. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT RECORDS 83 
constitutional values served by public access, [home] address . . . [information] 
should be protected.”128  With respect to categories such as medical records, he 
said that “most people would accept that there probably should be some limit 
on disclosing the names and addresses of people who have certain diseases[, 
but that] the state . . . [should nevertheless] provide aggregate information on 
the . . . reported incidents of . . . diseases and . . . the locations of the people 
who have them.”129  Although Professor Cate saw no harm per se in publishing 
Social Security numbers on the Internet, he acknowledged that it would be 
possible and in some cases, appropriate to disaggregate identifiers like the 
Social Security Number before publishing the “anonymized” remainder of a 
governmental record.130 
III.  CAN INFORMATION PRIVACY SURVIVE? 
A common view of the right to privacy holds that if a piece of information 
can be found anywhere in the public domain, it should be available from the 
state through open government records requests.131  For example, if a citizen’s 
home address can be found in the telephone book, voter registration records, or 
property tax records, this view holds that there is no “reasonable expectation of 
privacy,” and therefore the state should disclose the home address when it 
appears as part of any government record.132 
On this view, it is tempting to think the right to information privacy has 
vanished.  Under open government records statutes, it is the state, rather than 
commercial enterprise, disclosing information about individuals.  This makes a 
difference.133  An individual’s home address may be found in a telephone book 
or on the Internet, but this fact does not justify action by the government to 
disclose the same home address where the individual has an expectation of 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Cate Testimony, supra note 125, at 61. 
 130. Id. at 27. 
 131. See, e.g., Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 132. This view is consistent with criminal search-and-seizure laws.  The United States 
Supreme Court has held that, under the Fourth Amendment, unless a matter is kept secret, it 
enjoys no “reasonable expectation of privacy.”“  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  For example, the Court has found no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in sealed, opaque garbage bags discarded by the curb.  California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-
41 (1988).  On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment, which protects “the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” establishes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy within the four walls of the home.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 34 (2001) 
(thermal imaging).  See generally Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1121-24 (2002). 
 133. See Kinsella v. Welch, 827 A.2d 325, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (explaining 
the distinction between the constitutional right of privacy, which pertains to government action, 
and its common law namesake, which pertains to non-governmental action). 
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privacy and, indeed, has no alternative but to give the information to the 
government. 
A. Open Government Records and the Constitutional Right to Privacy 
Improper disclosure of information by the government is a recognized 
injury.134  The courts recognize a privacy interest every time the government 
discloses an individual’s home address, even when the disclosure results in 
only a minimal effect, such as unsolicited contact.135  The government has a 
duty to protect the privacy of individuals who have taken steps to protect 
themselves.136  This is true despite, and indeed because of, the technological 
advances that have made individuals vulnerable to unwarranted intrusions. 
State action has a constitutional dimension.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Whalen v. Roe has generated appellate precedent for the 
proposition that the state is not free to disclose confidential information about 
its citizens.137  A majority of circuit courts have accepted the constitutional 
right to information privacy.138 
The Third Circuit has articulated the constitutional right to information 
privacy, and repeatedly found a specific privacy interest in home address 
information.139  In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the court 
 
 134. See, e.g., Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1354-55 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
voter registration system found to be unconstitutional because it required voters to disclose their 
Social Security numbers publicly in order to vote). 
 135. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500-01 
(1994).  
 136. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
Constitution puts limits not only on the type of information the State may gather, but also on the 
means it may use to gather it.  The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data 
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information. . . .”). 
 137. See, e.g., Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 194, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 839-41, 848 (1st Cir. 1987); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 
1554, 1558-59 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 138. See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 
895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559; United States v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-580 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132, 1134 (5th 
Cir. 1978).  One circuit court has expressed “grave doubts” as the existence of the right, but has 
stopped short of confronting the issue of whether the right existed.  Am. Fed’n. of Govt. 
Employees v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791-93 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  The Sixth 
Circuit recognizes the right, but only as a narrow corollary to the decisional privacy cases, 
pertaining to personal information relating to one’s health, family, children, and other interests 
protected by the Court’s substantive due process right to privacy decisions.  J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 
F.2d 1080, 1089-90 (6th Cir. 1981). 
 139. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that case law 
“reflect[s] the general understanding that home addresses are entitled to some privacy protection, 
whether or not so required by a statute”). 
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described a balancing test to determine whether an individual’s interest in 
privacy outweighs the public interest in disclosure: 
The factors which should be considered in deciding whether an intrusion into 
an individual’s privacy is justified are the type of record requested, the 
information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent 
nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in 
which the record was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent 
unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for access, and whether there is an 
express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable 
public interest militating toward access.140 
Under this analysis, the government’s disclosure of home addresses under 
open government records statutes may in some cases violate a constitutionally 
protected right to privacy.141  This would occur if an individual’s interest in 
confidentiality outweighed the government’s interest in disclosure, but a 
government agency nevertheless disclosed the information.142 
Of course, many people do not care if their addresses are published.  
However, for some it can be a matter of life or death.  Rebecca Shaffer, for 
example, was killed by a stalker who got her address from motor vehicle 
records.143  The fact that some - or even most - people allow their home 
addresses to be published by commercial entities does not mean that the 
government should disclose the same information about the few who do not.  
As the Third Circuit explained: 
The compilation of home addresses in widely available telephone directories 
might suggest a consensus that these addresses are not considered private were 
it not for the fact that a significant number of persons, ranging from public 
officials and performers to just ordinary folk, choose to list their telephones 
privately, because they regard their home addresses to be private information.  
Indeed, their view is supported by decisions holding that home addresses are 
entitled to privacy under FOIA, which exempts from disclosure personal files 
 
 140. 638 F.2d at 578. 
 141. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 142. The constitutional interest in residential privacy has been held to outweigh the 6th 
Amendment right of confrontation.  See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9, 14-15 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1997) (name of anonymous victim); Montez v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76, 81-82 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (home addresses of witnesses); People v. Lewis, 184 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33-34 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (home addresses of arresting police officers).  But see Reid v. 
Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a victim’s right to 
privacy “cannot provide the basis for a. . .court. . .to interfere with the defendant’s normally 
unrestricted right to contact prosecution witnesses”). 
 143. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 n.4 (D. S.C. 1997).  See also Remsburg v. 
Docusearch, 816 A.2d 1001, 1005-06, 1008-09 (N.H. 2003) (Amy Boyer was murdered by 
stalker who obtained her home address via commercial database.). 
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“the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.”144 
Even loathsome members of society, such as sex offenders, have 
constitutional rights, including a limited privacy interest in home address 
information.  In Doe v. Poritz, the New Jersey Supreme Court reluctantly 
concluded that “under both the Federal and State Constitutions, the 
Registration and Notification Laws implicate protectable liberty interests in 
privacy and reputation, and therefore trigger the right to due process.”145  The 
 
 144. Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (quoting Freedom 
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)). 
 145. 662 A.2d 367, 420 (N.J. 1995).  The public reaction to Doe v. Poritz was outrage.  
Proposes Constitutional Amendment Establishing that State may make Available to General 
Public Certain Information Identifying Sex Offenders: Public Hearing Before the Assembly Law 
and Public Safety Committee, Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 1, 1-2 (2000), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/Pubhear/060100gg.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).  
The state constitution was amended to provide that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this 
Constitution and irrespective of any right or interest in maintaining confidentiality, it shall be 
lawful for the Legislature to authorize by law the disclosure to the general public of information 
pertaining to the identity, specific and general whereabouts, physical characteristics and criminal 
history of persons found to have committed a sex offense.” N.J. CONST., art. IV, § 7, ¶ 12 
(adopted Nov. 7, 2000 and effective date of Dec. 7, 2000).  The constitutional amendment 
stripped sex offenders of any right to privacy of their home address, but left the right to privacy 
intact for others.  Proposes Constitutional Amendment Establishing that State may make 
Available to General Public Certain Information Identifying Sex Offenders: Public Hearing 
Before the Assembly Law and Public Safety Committee, Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 1, 
1-2 (2000), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/Pubhear/060100gg.PDF (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2005).  The transcript of a public hearing makes it clear that this was the intent of 
the sponsors of the constitutional amendment: 
What we are looking to do with this constitutional amendment is to see that, once and for 
all, the public’s right to have knowledge about sexual predators is actually provided and 
that there is constitutional backing to allow such disclosure.Many of us, myself included, 
believe that, under both the New Jersey Constitution as well as the U.S. Constitution, 
notwithstanding the provisions of the 14th Amendment, that this right exists today. And 
nevertheless, given that there are those in the 3rd Circuit, as well as perhaps on our State 
Supreme Court, who feel differently, we want to make sure that there is no ambiguity as 
to the intent of this Legislature, and hopefully the administration, in terms of seeing that 
this information is information which rightly should be broadly disseminated.  The 
question, constitutionally, is whether or not the privacy rights of the individual sex 
offenders takes precedence over the public’s right to know.  We strongly believe that the 
right to know and to protect the public, given the nature and the high probability of 
recidivism of many of these offenders, clearly is of greater import than the protection of 
privacy rights of the individuals in question. 
Id.  Perhaps paradoxically, the full implication of the constitutional amendment is that, while sex 
offenders have been stripped of any privacy interest in home address information, that interest 
remains intact, and more specifically so, for other members of society.  See id. 
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Court explained that “disclosure of plaintiff’s home address, particularly when 
coupled with the other information disclosed, implicates a privacy interest.”146 
[T]he question of whether an individual has a privacy interest in his or her bare 
address does not fully frame the issue.  The more meaningful question is 
whether inclusion of the address in the context of the particular requested 
record raises significant privacy concerns, for example because the inclusion 
of the address can invite unsolicited contact or intrusion based on the 
additional revealed information.147 
i.  Home Addresses Appear In Context.  One objection to the assertion of 
constitutional protection for home address information is that legal authorities 
to date have dealt with compilations of personal information, rather than access 
merely to home addresses.148  As noted above, in Doe v. Poritz and Paul P. v. 
Verniero, the courts did not consider whether the plaintiffs had a privacy 
interest in home address information alone, but whether the inclusion of the 
plaintiffs’ addresses, along with other information, implicated any privacy 
interests.149 
This objection does not account for the fact that home addresses are always 
disclosed in a context.  Home address information would be almost 
meaningless if it were disclosed in a vacuum; it is hard to imagine that there 
would be any public interest in privacy with respect to a bare listing of 
residences.  Only when paired with other data - name, income, disability status, 
etc. does home address information invoke a public interest in privacy.  In 
some cases, the context of the information may touch an individual privacy 
interest that is sensitive enough to invoke statutory or constitutional 
protection.150 
Different jurisdictions have adopted different standards to determine 
whether personally identifiable information should be disclosed under open 
government records laws.  Some recommend creating categories of individuals 
whose home addresses and telephone numbers would be exempt from 
 
 146. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 409. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 399, 403-04 (3d Cir. 1999); Poritz, 662 A.2d at 
409. 
 149. See A.A. v. New Jersey, 341 F.3d 206, 212, 214 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that (1) sex 
offenders’ right of privacy in their home addresses gave way to the state’s compelling interest to 
prevent sex offenses, (2) the state’s internet publication of their home addresses did not violate 
offenders’ constitutional privacy rights, and (3) the state’s compilation of information on them, 
including offenders’ names, ages, race, birth date, height, weight, and hair color, did not violate 
offenders’ constitutional right to privacy). 
 150. See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (lists 
that contain only names and addresses carry significance because of context). 
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disclosure.151  Others, by contrast, recommend that records custodians be given 
discretion to deny access when there is clear evidence of the substantial 
likelihood of harm or threat resulting from the disclosure of personal 
information.152   
There has been a split in the circuits on this issue.  The Tenth Circuit has 
held that “the government must show that the dissemination of the information 
desired to be kept private would inflict specific and significant harm on 
individuals. . . .”153  The District of Columbia Circuit came out the other way 
on a very similar issue, holding that the government may restrict disclosure of 
people’s names and addresses in spite of a corporation’s First Amendment 
claim of entitlement to the information.154 
However, even under a “clear evidence of substantial likelihood of harm” 
standard, home address information has a constitutional dimension.  In 
Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, for example, the defense attorney for forty-one 
defendants charged with drug conspiracy sought the names and addresses from 
the personnel files of the police officers involved in the arrests.155  The court 
held that release of the information invaded the police officers’ privacy 
because it exposed them to a substantial risk of harm.156  Not only did it 
implicate their fundamental interest in personal safety, it also violated their 
constitutional rights.157  “The City’s release of private information . . . rises to 
constitutional dimensions by threatening the personal security and bodily 
integrity of the officers and their family members. . . .”158  The information 
extended beyond addresses; however, the court’s reasoning suggests that the 
primary concern giving rise to the privacy interest was the officers’ safety, and 
it is the address information that was central to these safety concerns.159 
The purpose of open government records statutes is to shed light on the 
operations of government agencies, not to publish information about 
individuals.160  Government agencies should not publish home addresses if the 
effect of the disclosure would be solely to disclose personal information about 
an individual, especially if the disclosure would shed no light on the conduct of 
 
 151. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254.21 (2003) (banning the posting of the home address 
or telephone number of any elected or appointed official); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.33 (2003) 
(making an elected official the custodian of his or her records). 
 152. See, e.g, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.35 (2003). 
 153. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 154. Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 155. 136 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 156. Id. at 1069. 
 157. Id. at 1069-70. 
 158. Id. at 1064.  For additional information on the public disclosure of the personal 
information of police officers, see Adam Liptak, A Web Site Causes Unease in Police: Its Creator 
Posts Personal Data on Officers in Washington State, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12, 2003, at A12. 
 159. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1059, 1067. 
 160. See Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976). 
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a public agency or official or on other governmental matters of significance to 
the public.161  Instead of creating castes in society, where some groups of 
people get special treatment, there should be categories of records that are 
accessible and non-accessible.  The safety of one group of people is no more 
important than that of another group. 
ii.  Other Confidential Information.  Home address information illustrates a 
wider debate about the extent to which state actors should disclose information 
about citizens pursuant to open government records requests.  Other data items 
may deserve confidential treatment as well, even if no specific statute were to 
speak to the specific datum.162  It would violate the public interest in privacy if 
state and local government agencies were to disclose information to the public 
that would otherwise be unobtainable.  Especially serious are examples of 
government records that contain sensitive information.  For example, 
municipal recreation department records often include children’s records, 
which may contain birth dates, emergency phone numbers, and medical 
conditions. 
Generally, the public should not have access to government records if the 
primary effect of the disclosure would be the dissemination of sensitive 
personal information about a particular private person, rather than shedding 
light on the conduct of a government agency or official or on other matters of 
significance to the public.163 
 
 161. See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).  This case 
involved a First Amendment challenge to a California statute that limited public access to the 
home address of people who had been arrested.  Id. at 34, 36.  The statute allowed access for 
“scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purpose, or . . . for investigation purposes,” but 
prohibited access that would be used for commercial purposes.  Id. at 34-35.  In the course of 
holding that the statute was not subject to facial challenge, and remanding for further 
proceedings, the Court noted that the state “could decide not to give out arrestee information at all 
without violating the First Amendment.”  Id. at 40.  See also Mainstream Mktg. Serv. v. FTC, 358 
F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding Do Not Call list against a First Amendment 
challenge); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 660 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding restrictions on junk faxes against First Amendment challenge). 
 162. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977) (holding that the 
president had a constitutionally-protected privacy interest in the records containing his private 
communications with his family). 
 163. The common law of “invasion of privacy” informs, to some extent, the public interest in 
privacy.  According to American Jurisprudence, “[t]he right of privacy is not infringed by the 
publication of matters of public record.”  62A AM. JUR. 2d Public Records § 107 (2005).  Under 
open government records statutes, however, it is the government, rather than commercial 
enterprise, disclosing information about individuals.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.35 (2003).  
This makes a difference.  Most states have adopted a system of categorizing four different kinds 
of invasions of privacy.  The four torts are: (1) “unreasonable publicity” of “private life,” (2) 
“intrusion,” such as hidden videotape cameras, (3) “appropriation,” such as the commercial use of 
someone’s name, image, or likeness, and (4) “false light” publicity that places someone in a false 
light in the public eye.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
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iii. No Sanctions for Reporting Information the Government Has 
Published.  It is well established that the government may not impose sanctions 
for re-publication of information that has been obtained through governmental 
channels.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down a number of statutes 
that prohibited the disclosure of information obtained from government 
records.  Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn established that a state may not sanction 
the press for publishing true information that has been disclosed in public court 
documents.164  Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County District Court, 
held that the state could not prohibit the media from disclosing information 
about a child when the media obtained the information by attending juvenile 
court proceedings.165  In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court struck 
down a statute prohibiting the publication of names of juvenile offenders, 
saying “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish 
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the 
highest order.166This principle was reiterated in Florida Star v. B.J.F., where a 
newspaper published the name of a rape victim, which it obtained from a 
police report.167  “We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful 
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be 
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest 
order . . . .”168 
These cases support the proposition that once the government makes 
information public, the government cannot subsequently sanction its further 
disclosure.  However, the cases do not establish that the government has an 
obligation to disclose the information in the first instance.  Indeed, in Cox 
Broadcasting, the Court noted that it was not reaching “any constitutional 
questions which might arise from a state policy not allowing access by the public 
and press to various kinds of official records . . . .”169 
There is an important distinction between conditions that might be placed on 
government records before they are disclosed, and restrictions or sanctions that 
are imposed after access has already been obtained.170  The First Amendment 
prohibits the state from placing post-access restrictions on disclosure, but it does 
not compel the state to disclose all records in the government’s files.171 
 
 164. 420 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1975). 
 165. 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977). 
 166. 443 U.S. 97, 98-99, 103 (1979). 
 167. 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989). 
 168. Id. at 541. 
 169. 420 U.S. at 496 n.26. 
 170. See generally Solove, supra note 1 (providing a full analysis of the jurisprudence of 
“unconstitutional conditions” as they attach to government records). 
 171. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text. 
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Indeed, government agencies, including local governments, may be 
exposed to lawsuits if the agencies violate the constitution.172  If public 
agencies were to disclose personal information, such as home addresses, under 
all circumstances, they could become subject to constitutional challenges that 
they may or may not win.  The better course is to empower public agencies to 
comply with requests for government records and still protect individual 
privacy. 
iv.  Data Accuracy. A common rationale for collecting information about 
citizens from government records is that the government data is used for 
verification, to enhance the quality and accuracy of the data in commercial 
databases.  The first known sampling, however, of individuals’ records 
compiled by two large data aggregators, ChoicePoint and Acxiom, found 
significant inaccuracy rates in personal data.173 
The study, organized by Privacy Activism, was based on eleven 
volunteers, who ordered their “ChoicePoint ScreenNow” background checks, 
which cost $20 each, and their Acxiom background reports, which cost $5.174  
They found that 100 percent of the ChoicePoint records had at least one 
error.175  Over one-third of the eleven participants never received their Acxiom 
reports, and 67% of the reports received had errors.176 
ChoicePoint claims to have 17 billion records on individuals and 
businesses, and sells data to 40 percent of the nation’s top 1,000 companies.177  
It also has contracts with major U.S. law enforcement and homeland security 
agencies.178  Its overall error rate was 35 percent.179  Acxiom, another 
aggregator, primarily serves the financial services industry.180  Companies can 
submit rosters of their customers to Acxiom, which can then provide 
 
 172. See, e.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the City of Columbus from disclosing certain personal 
information contained in police officers’ personnel files). 
 173. See LINDA ACKERMAN & DEBORAH PIERCE, PRIVACY ACTIVISM, DATA 
AGGREGATORS: A STUDY OF DATA QUALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS 1 (2005), 
http://www.privacyactivism.org/docs/DataAggregatorsStudy.pdf.  See e.g., Houston Chronicle 
Publ’g Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (finding that no effort 
was made to purge inaccurate or misleading entries on the “rap sheet” in question). 
 174. ACKERMAN & PIERCE, supra note 174, at 2-4. 
 175. Id. at 1. 
 176. Id. at 1, 7. 
 177. ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 145 (2005); ChoicePoint Annual Meeting 
of Shareholders, ChoicePoint, http://www.choicepoint.net/choicepoint/news/feature042903.html 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
 178. O’HARROW, supra note 178, at 156. 
 179. ACKERMAN & PIERCE, supra note 174, at 5. 
 180. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, ACXIOM CORP. 4 (2005), available at http://www.acxiom.com/ 
AppFiles/Download18/2005_Annual_Report-3BFCD5AD-85A1-45ED-A106-
AFC876B81142.pdf. 
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customers’ telephone numbers and data on home ownership or estimated 
income.181 Acxiom’s error rate was 13 percent.182 
The authors of the study acknowledged its limitations.183  “It is important 
to note that due to the small size of the data set, and the non-random 
distribution of participants, care should be taken in projecting this data to the 
full population.  As participants in the FTC Round-table noted, a detailed 
national study would be extremely difficult and expensive, and so it is 
worthwhile beginning with smaller studies such as this.”184 
However, they said their findings could indicate a larger problem. 
  The results from the study strongly imply a high rate of serious errors in 
the information provided by two of the largest data brokers in the United 
States, as well as a lack of responsiveness to consumers requesting their own 
information.  While the small sample size means we do not consider these 
results definitive, the figures unequivocally point to a need for a much larger 
study.185 
B. Court Records 
Court records provide another mother lode of information with commercial 
value.  They are being mined electronically and on paper to obtain information 
about individuals, for purposes totally unrelated to the reasons the information 
first landed in the courthouse.186  As with open government records statutes, 
the reasons for keeping records open to the public have more to do with 
supporting our democratic system of government than with the individuals 
whose records are in the system. 
This may seem paradoxical at first glance.  Court records have long been 
presumed open to the public, and the tradition of public access to court case 
files is rooted in constitutional principles.187  Upon examination and reflection, 
 
 181. O’HARROW, supra note 178, at 49-52. 
 182. ACKERMAN & PIERCE, supra note 174, at 5. 
 183. Id. at 2, 5. 
 184. Id. at 5. 
 185. Id. at 8. 
 186. Beth Givens, Public Records on the Internet: The Privacy Dilemma, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE 4, available at http://www.cfp2002.org/proceedings/proceedings/givens.pdf. 
 187. See Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1312 (1978) (“It is clear that courts 
of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 
including judicial records and documents.”); Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F. Supp 
1308, 1309 (D. Utah 1987) (acknowledging a constitutional right to access public documents 
based on Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 583-84 (1980), which stated that 
the First Amendment is based on access to information and Press- Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 518 (1984), which stated “a claim to access cannot succeed unless access 
makes a positive contribution to this process of self-governance”). 
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however, it is apparent that, as with open government records, the question of 
what is “public” should be the beginning rather than the end of the analysis.188 
i. Court Records Are Open to the Public Not Because They Are 
“Newsworthy,” But for the Purpose of Keeping the System Honest.  The 
presumption of public access to court records allows the citizenry to monitor 
the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty, and respect for 
our legal system.189  But it does not follow that every piece of personal 
information contained within a “public” record in the courthouse needs to be 
published worldwide on the Internet.  Publication of court records should be 
tailored to serve the court’s proper civic purposes, not to broadcast personally 
identifiable information like Social Security numbers. 
The reasons for keeping court records open to the public are several, 
reflecting the balance of powers among the branches of government and civic 
principles of government based upon the rights and duties of the individual.190  
For example, in criminal cases, open trials prevent prosecutorial 
misconduct.191  A very important aspect of criminal law in this country is the 
principle of holding law enforcement to its burden of proof.192  The executive 
branch, in the person of the prosecutor, is obliged not merely to conduct 
zealous prosecutions, but to serve the broader interests of justice.193  Criminal 
courts are open, therefore, in part to ensure that prosecutorial zeal is checked 
by rigorous legal standards. 
In civil cases, court proceedings are open to the public for a number of 
reasons.  Before damages are awarded, injunctions enforced, or money 
transferred from one pocket to another, our system demands that the process of 
adjudication be exposed to scrutiny. 
The reasons for keeping the system open to the public have to do with the 
health and well-being of our legal system, not for the benefit of consumer 
 
 188. “Mere speculation about hypothetical public benefits cannot outweigh a demonstrably 
significant invasion of privacy.”  U.S. Dep’t. of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179 (1991).  The 
Supreme Court emphasized in Ray that the disclosure of a list of names pursuant to a FOIA 
request was not inherently or always a threat to privacy, but “depends upon the characteristics 
revealed by virtue of being on the particular list, and the consequences likely to ensue.”  Id. at 176 
n.12 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 877 (1989)). 
 189. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-77 (finding that the First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials is predicated on openness, fairness, perception, and 
confidence in governmental process). 
 190. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1173 (listing four functions of government transparency). 
 191. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (stating that open trials assure that 
proceedings are conducted fairly and discourage perjury and misconduct). 
 192. See U.S. v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 461 (1827) (“In criminal proceedings, the onus 
probandi rests upon the prosecutor, unless a different provision is expressly made by statute.”). 
 193. 27 C.J.S. District and Prosecuting Attorneys § 29 (1999) (discussing prosecutorial 
duties). 
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profiling or other commercial interests.194  The Constitution provides for jury 
trials not only to determine questions of fact, but also to make the community 
an integral part of the judicial system.195  Open court records similarly serve an 
important educational function: not to titillate the masses with news of their 
neighbors’ misfortunes, but to support a functioning democracy.196  
Government records empower citizens to make good political decisions.  Court 
records publish final judgments and liens, facilitating business, and personal 
and legal affairs.197 
ii.  The Legal System Is Not About the Litigants, but About Self-
Government.  It is tempting to think that the American court system revolves 
around the litigants, i.e., the plaintiff and defendant.  To the contrary, the jury 
trial right guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment (civil trials) forms an 
important part of the American system of self-government.198 
The core interest underlying the American judicial system is not the 
interest of the parties, but of the citizens - the jurors and the gallery - who 
monitor the judges, the witnesses, the prosecutors, the police and the lawyers.  
Open public trials give the public an opportunity to deter corruption in the 
system. 
The institution of the jury . . . places the real direction of society in the hands 
of the governed . . . . . . and not in that of the government. . . . .  [It] invests the 
people, or that class of citizens, with the direction of society. 
  . . . The jury system as it is understood in America appears to me to be as 
direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as 
 
 194. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) 
(“[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of 
the judicial process and the government as a whole.  Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances 
the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the 
defendant and to society as a whole.”); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) 
(“[F]ree and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the 
rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as well 
as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and 
public accountability.”). 
 195. See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428 (1979). 
 196. Id. at 429; Anne-Marie Moyes, Note, Assessing the Risk of Executing the Innocent: A 
Case for Allowing Access to Physical Evidence for Posthumous DNA Testing, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
953, 986 (2002). 
 197. John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer 
Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 61, 124 (1992). 
 198. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 289, 295 (1966) (stating that the Seventh Amendment concerning jury trials in civil cases 
was a principal Antifederalist demand); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the 
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 667-669, 678 (1973) (explaining that the Seventh 
Amendment was a reaction to the powerful government established by the Constitution, and 
antifederalists sought to protect debtors and litigants from oppressive judges). 
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universal suffrage.  They are two instruments of equal power, which contribute 
to the supremacy of the majority.199 
For this reason, African-Americans and women have struggled for the right 
to serve on juries, not for the benefit of the parties, but for the sake of being 
part of the system.200  The infusion of these groups’ knowledge into the system 
also serves the overarching social purpose of protecting the innocent from 
erroneous verdicts of liability.201 
Traditionally, documents that make it through the courthouse door become 
part of the public record and open to scrutiny.  However, this tradition was not 
intended for the purpose of broadcasting details about the litigants.202  
Government records are made available to the public so that citizens can make 
political decisions, to instill confidence in the system, to make the government 
accountable, and to facilitate business, personal and legal affairs.203 
iii.  The Legal System is Not So Much About a “Search for Truth” As 
About Resolving Conflicts.  Very few “facts” are proved to a conclusion in the 
American system.  Only a fraction of lawsuits actually proceed to trial.204  This 
means that most of the “facts” recited in pleadings are not tested.  Moreover, 
there is a certain amount of “puffing” that goes into pleadings.205  If they are 
disseminated over the Internet, and especially if they are “newsworthy,” there 
are no guarantees whatever that any of the information on the Internet will be 
reliable.  This lack of reliability stands to undermine the perception of fairness 
and trust in the legal system. 
 
 199. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293-94 (1945); see also Gannett, 
443 U.S. at 428-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (finding that the public should be 
educated about the manner in which criminal justice is administered); Detroit Free Press v. 
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Democracies die behind closed doors.”). 
 200. Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 921 (2003). 
 201. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1986). 
 202. For this reason, discovery is not conducted in public domain, but in confidence.  Indeed, 
the government has a substantial interest in controlling and preventing discovery abuse.  See 
Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 690 (Wash. 1982); see also Wilk v. Am. Med. 
Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (7th Cir. 1981) (suggesting a party would not be entitled to a 
hearing if it brought suit solely to obtain discovery material); Hammock v. Hoffman LaRoche, 
Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 558 (N.J. 1995) (finding that the public interest in health and welfare may be 
invoked to prevent abuse of discovery for commercial gain or competitive advantage). 
 203. Robert Gellman, Public Records – Access, Privacy, and Public Policy: A Discussion 
Paper, 12 GOV’T INFO. Q., 391, 395 (1995). 
 204. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 29 
(1984). 
 205. R.J. Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and Its Ethics, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 
7 (1987). 
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Part of this hazard is the nature of the American adversary system.206  The 
primary objective of the adversary system is not so much to seek material truth 
as to resolve disputes in a way that will be acceptable to the parties and to 
society.  If the search for truth were supreme, privileges would not be 
recognized, and the vast majority of cases would not be resolved on consent. 
The difficulty with publishing every data item that comes into the 
courthouse is that although it would preserve the principle that judicial 
proceedings should be conducted in public, there is a substantial risk that over-
publication will have a chilling effect.  When people lose control over 
information about themselves, they change their behavior in ways that may 
harm society.207  The judiciary has recognized this; there is ample precedent 
for limiting disclosure when a chilling effect looms over litigants.208  The 
subpoena power, for example, can easily be used to destroy privacy and 
confidentiality, hence there are clearly defined restrictions and limitations on 
its use.209 
If litigants, jurors, and witnesses lose control over confidential information 
about themselves, they will similarly adopt privacy-protective behaviors, most 
likely by refusing to participate in the justice system.  This raises a significant 
risk to public confidence in the court system and to our functioning democracy. 
iv. Much of the System is Secret, While Individuals Are Exposed.  Personal 
information about individuals is a valuable commodity in the United States, 
where large commercial data aggregation companies sell Social Security 
numbers210 and create consumer profiles for profit.211  These companies, like 
 
 206. LANDSMAN, supra note 205, at 13 (finding that the adversary system evolved with the 
development of the jury system). 
 207. See infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text. 
 208. See, e.g., In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2nd Cir. 1987); Gaull v. Wyeth 
Labs. 687 F. Supp 77, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., 379 F. Supp. 
2d 680, 689 (M.D. Penn. 2005). 
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the community, and 4) injury from disclosure outweighs the benefit.  8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
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734 (5th Cir. 1953); U.S. v. Funk, 84 F. Supp 967 (E.D. Ky. 1949); O’Toole v. Ohio G.F. Ins. 
Co., 123 N.W. 795 (Mich. 1909); Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1956)).  
 210. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS: PRIVATE 
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THIS INFORMATION (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0411.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT, 
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS]. 
 211. In Europe, by contrast, information privacy is protected by law.  See Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 
http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_201185_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
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ChoicePoint and Reed Elsevier, work very hard to extract personal information 
about people from court records.212 
Meanwhile, much information about the judicial system itself remains 
secret.  For example, the courts operate with public money, but decisions as to 
the allocation of budget monies are made in secret.213  These decisions affect 
the public, but the public is not informed as to how or why they are made.  
State courts offer many programs affecting the operation of the judicial system, 
such as mediation, arbitration, child custody, and pretrial intervention.214  “All 
of these programs cost time and money, and affect court personnel, litigants, 
lawyers and the public.”215  They are adopted in a process that is not 
publicized.216  Thus, individuals are exposed to scrutiny, while much of the 
system itself remains secret. 
v. Courthouse Data Generates Profits for Data Aggregators While 
Potentially Harming Individuals.  Civil cases are filed because litigants have 
failed to reach a private compromise.  This fact does not transform the 
litigants’ pleadings, or evidence submitted with motion practice, into a 
commodity that should be public for any and all purposes.  Inaccuracies spawn 
statistics and perceptions that are incorrect. 
The judiciary has been wary of discovery abuse for commercial gain (or 
competitive advantage), and its concerns should extend to other aspects of 
administering justice.217  Unhindered access to case files may result in a further 
increase in identity theft.  Marketers may take advantage of compiled records 
to target advertising at former litigants and witnesses.  Personal information 
that is disclosed for the purposes of litigation could unfairly stigmatize a 
litigant in his or her future pursuit of employment or educational 
opportunities.218 
 
 212. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, ChoicePoint, http://www.epic.org/privacy/ 
choicepoint/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2006) (listing ChoicePoint as a company that sells information 
and listing Reed Elsevier as a “private sector data seller” along with ChoicePoint, Experian, Polk, 
Seisint and Acxiom). 
 213. Martin L. Haines, Privacy in the Courts v. the Public Right to Know, N.J. LAW., Feb. 
2002, at 37. 
 214. See, e.g., id. at 39 (discussing New Jersey). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Although Judge Haines argues that all of the programs are adopted in a process 
involving extensive unwritten reports, the author disagrees with this statement and believes 
instead that many, but not all programs are adopted in such a way.  See id. 
 217. Security is also an important aspect of electronic access to court files, as electronic files 
can be hacked, modified, stolen and misused.  See Michael Whiteman, Appellate Court Briefs on 
the Web: Electronic Dynamos or Legal Quagmire?, 97 L. LIBR. J. 467, 476-78 (2005) (discussing 
various privacy concerns related to electronic filing). 
 218. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181-82 (1990) (showing that the fact that 
information has been disclosed to one individual does not mean that it can be freely disclosed to 
another – a guest in somebody’s home cannot open the door to the police to conduct a search). 
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vi.  To Say “Public is Public” Is Too Simplistic.  Just because a piece of 
information is in a “public record” ’does not mean it can be published for any 
purpose.  The U.S. Supreme Court explained this at length in U.S. Department 
of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.219  “[There is a] 
privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain information even 
where the information may have been at one time public.”220  One need not 
maintain perfect secrecy in order to maintain a degree of confidentiality.  
“[T]he fact that an event is not wholly ‘private’ does not mean that an 
individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the 
information.”221 
The inherent difficulty of obtaining and distributing paper files used to 
effectively insulate individuals from the harm that could result from misuse of 
information in government records.  The Court referred to the relative 
difficulty of gathering paper files as “practical obscurity,” and recognized that 
it influenced the privacy equation.222  “Plainly there is a vast difference 
between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of 
courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the 
country and a [government-created] computerized summary located in a single 
clearinghouse of information.”223 
It is overly simplistic to say that “public records are public records.”  As 
discussed above, court records are not public because of any inherent 
characteristics; they are public for reasons that have to do with our system of 
self-government.  Moreover, electronic records have attributes that 
fundamentally change the premises for categorizing information as “public.”“  
The judiciary should resist the temptation to rely on oversimplified arguments 
that once a document can be found in the public domain it can no longer be 
considered private.224  Instead, the courts should consider afresh the reasons 
for making court records public and draw a distinction among the kinds of 
documents that should be made available online. 
Litigants do not give up their privacy rights simply because they have walked, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, through the courthouse door.  . . .  The mere 
payment of a filing fee entitles a plaintiff to compel production of intensely 
personal and confidential information, such as medical records, marital 
information, religious documents, financial records, and even trade secrets or 
 
 219. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
 220. Id. at 767. 
 221. Id. at 770. 
 222. Id. at 762. 
 223. Id. at 764. 
 224. The government may not impose sanctions for publishing information the government 
itself has already placed in the public domain, but it has no affirmative obligation to publish 
personally identifiable information about citizens.  See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying 
text. 
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intellectual property.  The defendant, of course, can respond in kind.  The loss 
of privacy through litigation is compounded when the information is disclosed 
to the media, competitors, political adversaries, and even curious members of 
the public.225 
This makes the courts and other state actors the guardians of a “public 
interest in privacy.”“  The government has a duty to protect its citizens from 
incursions upon their privacy interests.  Instead, however, the distinction 
between governmental and commercial interests is fading.  Government 
records are being used to build commercial databases, and governments are 
purchasing commercial databases, apparently for the purpose of building 
dossiers on citizens. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES 
Commercial databases are having an increasing impact on civil liberties, 
and several recent governmental initiatives have sought to exploit private-
sector databases to monitor both legal and illegal activity.  As a result, federal 
statutes have been eviscerated, civil rights compromised, and constitutional 
protections weakened. 
A. The Distinction Between Governmental and Commercial Databases 
A current myth about information privacy is that a meaningful distinction 
can be drawn between governmental and commercial databases.  The myth is 
pervasive for two reasons: 1) we have internalized the metaphor of Big Brother 
as a governmental entity; and 2) the word “private” sometimes means “non-
governmental” (as in “private sector”).226  In reality, however, the distinction is 
softening, with significant implications for the privacy interests of 
individuals.227 
i. Commercial Databases Are Being Used to Eviscerate Statutory 
Protections.  The federal government is using commercial databases to bypass 
statutory requirements.  For example, commercial databases are being used to 
circumvent the Privacy Act.228  Federal agencies purchase databases from 
 
 225. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 466 (1991). 
 226. See Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of 
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW AND PHIL. 559, 567-69 (1998). 
 227. As the Government Accountability Office recently reported, “many federal data mining 
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as well as private sector organizations.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING: 
FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d04548.pdf. 
 228. SENATE MAJORITY TASK FORCE ON THE INVASION OF PRIVACY, NY. SENATE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (Mar. 2000), http://www.senate.state.ny/Docs/nyspriv00.pdf; 5 U.S.C. § 
552a (2004). 
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companies like ChoicePoint, Dun & Bradstreet, and Lexis Nexis.229  
Commercial airlines have admitted disclosing the travel records of millions of 
passengers.230  As noted in USA Today, “JetBlue provided the records of 1.1 
million passengers to a private company working on an Army security project.  
By matching the data to Social Security numbers and addresses, the contractor 
could create detailed dossiers for a controversial air-travel-security plan it was 
promoting.”231  JetBlue publicly apologized, but even still USA Today called 
the Privacy Act “too porous to protect today’s citizens.”232 
The Department of Defense and a private contractor have been building an 
extensive database of 30 million 16-to-25-year-olds, apparently in violation of 
the Privacy Act, “which requires that government agencies accept public 
comment before new records systems are created.”233  The database, which has 
been in development since 2002, combines names with Social Security 
numbers, grade-point averages, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers.234  The 
Army has acknowledged it has been struggling to meet recruitment goals to 
replenish the ranks of the all-volunteer services.235  The Pentagon purchased 
the names of 3.1 million high school graduating seniors and an additional 4.7 
million college students.236  Drawing information from motor vehicle records, 
Selective Service registrations and private vendors, the database includes a 
variety of personal information, including grades, height, weight, and social 
security numbers.237 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), has been similarly 
compromised.  For example, FCRA provides that records of bankruptcies may 
be expunged after 10 years.238  Now that bankruptcy filings are routinely 
published on the Internet, commercial entities can download and keep the 
 
 229. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
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bankruptcy records indefinitely in their proprietary databases.239  Unless 
individuals somehow acquire a statutory right to review, correct, and expunge 
their records, there will be no practical way to clear one’s name and credit 
rating - ever. 
ii. Commercial Databases Are Being Used to Violate Civil Rights.  State 
actors have used commercial databases for purposes that have harmed and 
threaten to harm civil rights such as voting rights,240 the right to travel,241 and 
the right to associate.242  Thousands of citizens were erroneously deleted from 
the lists of registered voters in the November 2000 election, when the State of 
Florida purchased records from ChoicePoint to purge the voter rolls of 
convicted felons.243  The data were inaccurate, and the disenfranchised voters 
had no recourse. 
The right to travel will be affected by “Secure Flight,” a program 
implemented by the Transportation Security Agency (“TSA”).244  The purpose 
of Secure Flight is to match airline passengers against lists of suspected 
terrorists.245  In July 2005, however, the Government Accountability Office 
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recognized that citizens enjoy a constitutional right to travel.  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
500 (1999). 
The right to travel is a part of the “liberty” of which the citizen cannot be deprived 
without the due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. . . .  Freedom of movement 
across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. 
Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be 
as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. 
Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values. . . . “Our nation,” wrote Chafee, 
“has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every 
American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he 
pleases.” 
Kent, 357 U.S. at 125-26. 
 242. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“Inviolability of privacy in 
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of 
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”). 
 243. Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It 
May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A6. 
 244. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AVIATION SECURITY: SECURE FLIGHT 
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING UNDER WAY, BUT RISKS SHOULD BE MANAGED AS SYSTEM IS 
FURTHER DEVELOPED (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05356.pdf. 
 245. See Letter from Cathleen A. Berrick, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, 
& Linda D. Koontz, Director of Information management Issues to Congressional Committees 1 
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reported that TSA was using commercial data from corporations to compile 
dossiers on passengers, in order to give them a “risk score.”246  This score in 
theory would determine a prospective passenger’s “risk” to airline safety by 
analyzing their credit rating, how recently they moved, what kind of job they 
had, and other data.247  The Government Accountability Office reported that 
TSA violated the Privacy Act; TSA did not disclose its use of personal 
information drawn from commercial sources or give the public an opportunity 
to comment.248  Indeed, TSA’s contractor “collected more than 100 million 
commercial data records containing personal information . . . without 
informing the public.”249 
These examples illustrate that commercial databases can be used not only 
to impair the right to vote and the right to interstate travel, but also to create 
secret government dossiers on individuals.  The loss of anonymity can easily 
be exploited to burden the First Amendment right to free association and other 
liberty interests.250 
iii.  Commercial Databases Create Dossiers for the Government.  The 
government has unmatched power to centralize all the private sector data that 
is being generated for commerce.  The ACLU recently reported that the 
Department of Justice 
has an $8 million contract with ChoicePoint that allows government agents to 
tap into the company’s vast database of personal information on 
individuals. . . . . . . .  The Treasury Department runs a database that collects 
financial information from thousands of banks and other financial 
 
(July 22, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05864r.pdf (discussing the results 
of a review of the Secure Flight Program) [hereinafter Berrick & Koontz Letter]. 
 246. See Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies in the ‘Friendly Skies’, ALTERNET, Jul. 27, 2005, 
http://www.alternet.org/rights/23728.  But see Berrick & Koontz Letter, supra note 246, at 5, 7 
(stating that TSA gathered the information to test the accuracy of commercial databases). 
 247. See Schneier, supra note 247. 
 248. See Berrick & Koontz Letter, supra note 246, at 6-7, 9. 
 249. Id. at 2. 
 250. Anonymity and pen names have a rich history in the United States.  “Anonymous 
pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of 
mankind.”  Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).  The Federalist Papers were published 
under the fictitious name “Publius,” concealing the identities of the true authors, James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton and John Jay.  The Federalist Papers, http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/federalist/ 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2006).  Mark Twain was the pen name of Samuel Longhorne Clemens, 
George Eliot of Mary Ann Evans, and Voltaire of Francois Marie Arouet.  Voltaire, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voltaire (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).  “Anonymity is a shield from the 
tyranny of the majority.  It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and the First 
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation – and their ideas from 
suppression – at the hand of an intolerant society.”  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 356 (1995). 
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institutions. . . . . . . .251 [In addition, the federal Department of Education] 
maintains an enormous information bank holding . . . . . . educational records 
on individuals stretching from their primary school years through higher 
education.  Under the USA PATRIOT Act, the FBI can force anyone to turn 
over records on their customers or clients, giving the government unchecked 
power to rifle through individuals’ financial records, medical histories, Internet 
use, travel patterns, or any other records.252 
There is little oversight.  Over the past 20 years, the Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”),253 congressional committees, and agency 
Privacy Act officers have regularly criticized the Office of Management and 
Budget for not living up to its duty as the executive branch’s Privacy Act 
overseer.254  In a detailed report, the GAO found major inconsistencies among 
agencies and said guidance was sorely lacking in the area of “electronic 
records.”255 
iv. The Databases Skew and Corrupt Data with Far-Reaching 
Implications.  When people are afraid their private information will be 
misused, they resort to behaviors that have an adverse impact on society at 
large.  The clearest example of this is in the health care industry, where 
medical patients often use deceit in order to protect themselves.256  One out of 
every six Americans now engages in some form of privacy-protective 
behavior.257  These behaviors include lying to doctors, asking doctors to lie to 
 
 251. Jay Stanley & Barry Steinhardt, Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The Growth of an 
American Surveillance Society 8, ACLU, Jan. 2003, http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id= 
11572.pdf. 
 252. See Simpson, supra note 244, at A1 (reporting that executive branch agencies were 
purchasing “troves of personal data from the private sector,” and quoting government sources for 
the proposition that DOJ, FBI, USMS, INS, and IRS employees had electronic access to citizens’ 
assets, phone numbers, driving records, and other personal information from their desktop 
computers).  The article reported that ChoicePoint, a publicly-held company and its competitors 
were supplying citizens’ personal information to at least thirty-five federal government agencies.  
Id. 
 253. The Government Accountability Office was “formerly known as the General Accounting 
Office.  See GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 
(2004); GAO’s Name Change and Other Provisions of the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 
2004, www.gao.gov/about/namechange.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
 254. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVACY ACT: OMB LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO 
IMPROVE AGENCY COMPLIANCE 7, 14 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d03304.pdf. 
 255. See id. at 25. 
 256. See Confidentiality of Patient Records: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Health of the 
House Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. (2000), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy.asp?file=legacy/health/106cong/2-17-00/2-17gold.htm 
(statement of Janlori Goldman, Director, Health Privacy Project, Inst. for Health Care Research & 
Policy, Georgetown University) [hereinafter Goldman Statement]. 
 257. Id. (quoting a 1999 survey conducted by the California Health Care Foundation). 
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insurance companies, asking doctors to keep two sets of records, paying out-
of-pocket for services (especially psychiatric services) that are covered by 
insurance, and, in the worst cases, refusing to seek treatment at all, lest the 
patient’s health data be misused.258  The most poignant example of harm is 
untreated HIV infection.259  This has a widespread negative impact because 
public health data become untrustworthy.260 
Similarly, the Bureau of the Census has encountered resistance to its 
constitutional mandate because of citizens’ privacy concerns.261  In order to 
encourage full compliance with requests for demographic information, census 
data cannot be used for any purpose other than the statistical purpose for which 
it was collected and cannot be published in any way that would permit 
identification of an individual.262 
v. The Owners of Commercial Databases Exercise and Abuse Power Over 
Individuals.  Most individuals have no choice but to participate in commercial 
databases in order to get basic services in the community.  Commercial 
databases can be used to create an underclass of people who have difficulty 
getting jobs, cannot get credit, and for whom life is more expensive because of 
a low credit score.263  Data mining companies that perform employee 
background checks keep permanent records of arrests and criminal sentences 
that cannot be corrected or expunged.264  In 2002, pharmaceutical giant Eli 
Lilly fired many employees ’on the grounds they had criminal records, no 
matter how remote in time or relevance to the employees’ current job 
 
 258. See id. 
 259. See PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES FOR THE CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE 
FOUNDATION, MEDICAL PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY SURVEY 20-21 (1999), available at 
http://www.chcf.org/documents/ihealth/topline.pdf (noting that 81 out of 100 national survey 
respondents believed that unique health identifiers would lead people with AIDS to avoid seeking 
care for fear of being exposed). 
 260. See Goldman Statement, supra note 257, at 3. 
 261. See THOMAS S. MAYER, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY 
RESEARCH AND THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 2 (2002), http://www.census.gov/srd/papers/pdf/rsm2002-01.pdf. 
 262. See 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1997); Bureau of the Census, Census Confidentiality and Privacy: 
1790-2002, http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/conmono2.pdf. 
 263. See HENDRICKS, supra note 41, at 13.  For example, a 38-year-old single mother can lose 
a job as a secretary, based on a shoplifting conviction at age 19.  Even if she had the resources to 
hire counsel to have her conviction expunged from the official court records, she could not 
remove the black spot from commercial databases.  As a consequence, she may have trouble 
obtaining loans, getting jobs, and renting a domicile.  See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying 
text.  
 264. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.  Individuals have no right to correct or 
review information about themselves where the Privacy Act, FOIA and the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act do not apply.  Commercial databases are proprietary.  If a commercial enterprise keeps 
permanent records of arrests and criminal sentences, there exists no practical way for an 
individual to challenge the records, much less amend or correct them. 
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responsibilities.265  Minority groups are disproportionately represented in the 
vulnerable population of people who have such records.266 
The Financial Services Modernization Act, better known as Gramm-
Leach-Bliley (“GLB”), repealed old Depression-era legislation267 that 
prevented banks, brokers, and insurers from exchanging information with each 
other about their customers.268  Under the new legislation, these financial 
institutions may disclose or sell (for profit) their customers’ financial 
information.269 This information includes checks, account balances, deposits 
and withdrawals, and the dates, amounts, and recipients of credit card charges.  
When consumers fill out loan applications, apply for insurance, or purchase 
securities, they disclose a tremendous amount of information.  Financial 
institutions are now free to share that information with each other and sell it to 
unrelated third parties.’270 
Some companies are collecting blood and tissue samples as well as 
medical information.  Genelex, a genetics company in Redmond, Washington, 
“has amassed 50,000 DNA samples, many gathered surreptitiously for 
paternity testing.”271  Whether or not the DNA is collected with the 
individual’s knowledge, the data may be “stored without donors’ knowledge.  
Cells banked for one purpose, such as medical diagnosis, have been shared 
with or sold to other users for research or profit.”272 
vi. Many Commercial Databases Are Created by Involuntary Participation 
or Coercion to Obtain Basic Commodities and Services.  In order to function 
in society, one must interact with commercial databases.  For example, one 
must carry auto insurance in order to drive a car legally.  One’s credit score is 
even more important, not only for borrowing money, but for an increasing 
 
 265. Ann Davis, Zero Tolerance: Employers Dig Deep Into Workers’ Pasts, Citing Terrorism 
Fears, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2002, at A1. 
 266. See HENDRICKS, supra note 41, at 235-46; see also RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
RECORDS OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH, FINAL REPORT, 12-14, June 28, 2004, available at 
http://www.courts.state.mn.us/cio/public_notices/accessreport.htm. 
 267. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932; Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162. 
 268. Glass Steagall Act, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass-Steagall_Act. 
 269. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et. seq. (2000). 
 270. See STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra note 252, at 6.  The risks associated with the re-
disclosure of financial information are not limited to legal transactions.  Banks and other 
corporations have a duty of care to their customers to ensure their personal data is not misused in 
the absence of privacy statutes.  Such a duty of care is eclipsed, however, by a culture of few 
constraints on the treatment of personal data.  This leaves corporations and law enforcement ill-
equipped to respond to abuses of information.  See Todd R. Weiss, Scope of Bank Data Theft 
Grows to 676,000 Customers, COMPUTERWORLD, May 20, 2005; see also BRUCE SCHNEIER, 
BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (2003). 
 271. Dana Hawkins, Keeping Secrets: As DNA Banks Quietly Multiply, Who is Guarding the 
Safe?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 2002, at 58. 
 272. Id. 
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number of ordinary transactions.  Prospective employers,273 landlords,274 and 
many others look at credit scores.  Perhaps the most troubling recent use of the 
credit score is by insurance companies to establish rates.275  In short, one’s 
ability to receive even the most basic services can come down to a number: the 
credit score.276 
Medical data can show up in your credit report.277 This “means your 
banker, after seeing that credit-card payment you made to the local 
psychiatrist, might decide he would rather not give you a loan.”278  Under 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, financial institutions can sell (or give away) this 
information unless you opt-out.279 
Consistent with their obligations to protect the public interest in privacy 
and the constitutional right to information privacy, governmental agencies, 
including the judiciary, should carefully weigh and consider the definition of 
“public” for the purposes of publishing personally identifiable information.  
Not every data item (such as Social Security Number) and not every record 
(such as records of minor children) need be separately protected by statute in 
order for state actors to meet these obligations. 
B. National ID Cards 
A governmental data-collection program with considerable appeal for 
many is the creation of a national identification card.  In the United States, 
national ID cards have been proposed - and rejected - for years, for a variety of 
purposes: to streamline government services, to fight tax evasion, to secure 
borders, and to make health care more affordable.280  For the purpose of 
combating terrorism, this hardy perennial has gained considerable support.281  
A major difficulty with respect to terrorism, however, is that no identification 
system, no matter how sophisticated, can identify terrorists before they commit 
crimes. 
i. National Databases. A national ID card would be the most visible 
component of a massive verification and tracking infrastructure.  The card 
 
 273. Jennifer Bayot, Use of Credit Records Grows in Screening Job Applicants, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 28, 2004, § 10, at 1. 
 274. Motoko Rich, A Blacklist For Renters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, at F4. 
 275. Beth Kobliner, Borrower Beware: Credit Scorers Are Watching, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
2002, § 3, at 8. 
 276. If one’s credit score is too low, one will have difficulty getting a job, obtaining a loan, 
getting a mortgage, renting an apartment. 
 277. See HENDRICKS, supra note 41, at 13. 
 278. See Sean Marciniak, Medical Data Can Show Up in Credit Reports, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
6, 2003, at D2. 
 279. Id. 
 280. STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra note 252, at 6. 
 281. National ID Cards: 5 Reasons Why They Should Be Rejected, ACLU, Sept. 8, 2003, 
http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=13501&c=39 [hereinafter National ID Cards]. 
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itself would be of no use without a database to verify and monitor the 
movements of millions of individuals.282  The database would require constant 
attention to keep it up to date.283  To make it work, the United States would 
need a nationwide architecture, so that every airport gate worker and every 
police officer would have a card-reading device.  It is no wonder technology 
companies have enthusiastically promoted this kind of system; its maintenance 
would be spectacularly profitable.284  Whoever creates and maintains the 
database must build it to the highest levels of data security, including 
transmission that prevents interception, storage that prevents theft, and system-
wide architecture to prevent both intrusion and compromise by corrupt or 
deceitful agents within the organization. 
Even the most efficient and secure system will not protect the United 
States against terrorism, however.  For foreign nationals, for example, the 
chain of identification begins and ends with their passports.285  “Breeder” 
documents like birth certificates and drivers’ licenses will determine the 
quality of the initial enrollment or registration within the system.  If a terrorist 
with a fake passport were to obtain a national ID card, even one with his or her 
own biometric attached, the most technologically sophisticated database would 
be worthless.286 
Even supposing, for the sake of argument, that the United States had 
flawlessly designed counterfeit-proof cards that could interface through a 
secure “reader” to a database system that contained only well-verified lawful 
information on citizens.  Assume further that the information on the cards were 
accessible only to properly authorized civil authorities who would never dream 
 
 282. Privacy vs. Security: Tread Carefully, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 124. 
 283. See National ID Cards, supra note 282. 
 284. See Jeffrey Rosen, Silicon Valley’s Spy Game, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 14, 2002, at 48. 
 285. See, e.g., Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National 
Identification Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 324 (2002).  A foreign national’s ability to 
prove legal residence in the United States fundamentally comes down to that individual’s 
passport.  If the passport is counterfeit, it may nevertheless be used to obtain a driver’s license, 
Social Security number, and other identification documents. 
 286. See SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 239-40 (Deborah Russell ed., 2000); BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING 
SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 193 (2003).  The cure for the problem of 
“breeder” documents is not simply to require more of them.  See, e.g., Charles C. Mann, 
Homeland Insecurity, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2002, at 81-102.  Several of the 9-11 
hijackers, for example, had valid drivers’ licenses, purchased illegally from employees of 
Virginia’s Department of Motor Vehicles.  Jerry Markon, Va. DMV Official Accused in Fraud 
Probe, WASH. POST, July 13, 2005, at B5.  The Commonwealth of Virginia responded by 
requiring more paperwork to get a drivers license, but the solution did not fix the problem.  Elaine 
Rivera, Hardships Cited In Va. License Law, WASH. POST, May 12, 2004, at B8.  An arrest in 
July 2005 “marked the second time in two years that a Northern Virginia DMV employee was 
accused of fraudulently selling licenses for cash.  A similar scheme two years ago at the DMV . . .  
led to the guilty pleas of two employees.”  Markon, supra, at B5. 
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of using the information for any unauthorized purpose.  Unless a terrorist was 
already in the database and had garnered enough suspicion to merit a full 
database search, no national ID card would stop him or her at the border. 
With a national ID card and its corresponding database infrastructure, 
every glitch in the system would be costly.  For example, if you lose a credit 
card, you can cancel it and get a new one.  If you lose a national ID, by 
contrast, the consequences are much more significant, not just for you, but for 
those who rely on the database, such as airport security guards and the police, 
not to mention the technicians who operate the database.  Other countries that 
use national ID cards have found that their usefulness to police has been 
marginal.287  Instead of assisting law enforcement, the cards tend to become 
essential for all dealings with financial institutions, government benefits, 
securing employment, renting cars, and entering office buildings.288 
The venerable history of the Social Security Number illustrates the 
tendency toward “function creep.”289  The Social Security Number originally 
ensured that workers paid into the system but soon became a prerequisite for 
taxation and government services, and found its way into private databases as 
the key to massive amounts of personal data.290  This tendency imperils even 
the most innocuous and best-intentioned identification schemes. 
For example, a strong argument in favor of national ID cards is their 
exculpatory value.  An airline passenger could simply flash a “trusted traveler” 
card at the airport and avoid being detained.291  This would eliminate the 
inconvenience of having to register with the government, would be spread 
across all social groups, and would end ethnic profiling because disfavored 
groups would not be singled out for negative treatment.  If they were very 
 
 287. Is National ID Card the Answer?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 18, 2001, at 3J. 
 288. Id. 
 289. See Richard Cohen, IDs All Around, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2001, at A23. 
 290. See GAO REPORT, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, supra note 211, at 4. 
 291. The Orlando Airport is piloting a new pre-screening program called “Clear,” which, for 
$80 a year, will allow travelers to use an exclusive security line with a promise of no random 
secondary pat-down.  Brian Bergstein, Voluntary Security ID to Debut at Florida Airport, 
AIRPORT BUS. ONLINE, June 6, 2005, http://www.airportbusiness.com/article/article.jsp?id=2274 
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Department of Homeland Security and submit to fingerprint and iris scans.  Id.  According to the 
“Clear” program website, “Your Membership will be continuously reviewed by TSA’s ongoing 
Security Threat Assessment Process.  If your security status changes, your Membership will be 
immediately deactivated and you will receive a notification email of your status change as well as 
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http://www.flyclear.com/clear_howclearworks.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2005).  Security expert 
Bruce Schneier ridicules the program: “Think about it.  For $80 a year, any potential terrorist can 
be automatically notified if the Department of Homeland Security is on to him.  Such a deal.”  
Bruce Schneier, News, CRYPTO-GRAM NEWSL., Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.schneier.com/crypto-
gram-0508.html. 
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reliable, the cards could be used for writing checks, verifying credit cards, and 
at traffic stops.  They would become ubiquitous, but only for privileged 
segments of society.  For practical purposes, the more significant aspect of a 
national ID system would be its potential to locate and track people, 
substantially increasing the state’s police power and making it easier for the 
commercial sector to classify individuals into micro-markets. 
ii.  Real ID.  In 2005, Congress adopted a statute popularly known as “Real 
ID,” which would convert one’s drivers’ license into a national ID card.292  
Every state will be required to issue a uniform drivers’ license, which must 
include not only a variety of personal data but also a digital photograph of the 
person (enabling face-recognition software) and possibly some other biometric 
such as fingerprints or iris scans.293  The personal data collected by any state 
motor vehicle agency will be accessible to every state and local official, 
including police officers and to the federal government through the 
construction of a massive interconnected database of license holders from all 
50 states.294 
The federalized drivers’ license must contain a standard “machine 
readable” element, most likely in the form of an RFID295 chip or the sort of 
computer chip found in “smart” credit cards.296  In practical terms, this means 
that a single cheap and widely available machine (such as a bar code scanner 
or RFID reader) will be able to read and store the data on all of the hundreds of 
millions of drivers’ licenses in the country.297  When a drivers’ license is used 
for any type of identification (including private purchases) it can, and will, be 
scanned and the data collected.298  Banks, merchants, and health care providers 
will ask for the card and harvest the data.299  Picture, address, date of birth and 
other data on the license will then be sold to data aggregators like 
ChoicePoint.300  This will in turn result in the creation of one or more massive 
and detailed private databases (in addition to the government database) that 
will cover virtually every American over the age of 16 and will contain a vast 
array of information from address and picture to purchasing and lifestyle 
habits.  Consistent with current practice, federal and state agencies will buy 
access to these private databases, giving government entities easy access to 
 
 292. H.R. 418, 109th Cong. §§ 1, 202 (2005); see also H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 202 (2005). 
 293. H.R. 418, 109th Cong. § 202(b); H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 202(b). 
 294. See H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 202(d)(12). 
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 296. H.R. 418, 109th Cong. § 202(b)(9); H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. § 202(b)(9). 
 297. See STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra at note 252, at 12. 
 298. See id. at 12-13. 
 299. See id. at 12. 
 300. See id. at 7. 
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even more data, far more than they themselves have the statutory authority to 
collect.301 
As things stand today, a national ID system promises to provide the worst 
of both worlds: a system that enables surveillance of the population in general 
but provides zero increased protection against terrorists.302 
C. Generalized Surveillance 
The public interest in privacy should protect individuals against disclosure 
by their government of personal information about them.  As such, the public 
interest in privacy imposes certain limits on governmental action.  This 
limitation on governmental power should extend as well to generalized 
surveillance of the population. 
Generalized and passive surveillance can be the condition of life in a 
tyrannical police state, as memorably portrayed in Orwell’s 1984.303  It can 
also be merely the result of gradual desensitization in the United States, where 
consumer profiling is routine, panoptical television sets are marketed as highly 
desirable, and people relish the thought of being on television. 
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments have never been invoked against 
generalized and passive surveillance of whole populations.304  There are 
criminal penalties and civil remedies for abuses of technology that have 
 
 301. See STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra at note 252, at 8. 
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from requirements that agencies maintain only accurate timely, complete, relevant and necessary 
information about individuals, as mandated by the Privacy Act of 1974.  Proposed Rule, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 43661 (July 28, 2005).  Under the FBI’s proposed rule, citizens would not be able to access 
or correct this information, and they will have no judicially enforceable right of redress for 
negative determinations made on the basis of the system.  Id.  The Department of Justice 
Inspector General reported in June 2005 that 
Our review of the consolidated watch list identified a variety of issues that contribute to 
weaknesses in the completeness and accuracy of the data, including variances in the 
record counts between [two versions of the database], duplicate records, missing or 
inappropriate handling instructions or categories, missing records, and inconsistencies in 
identifying information between [the terrorist screening database] and source records. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT DIVISION, AUDIT REPORT NO. 05-27, 
REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER CHPT. 7 (June 2005). 
 303. See Nissenbaum, supra note 227, at 569. 
 304. But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment did 
not support a challenge to generalized passive surveillance). 
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become old-fashioned, like wiretapping.305  However, new surveillance 
technologies are far less heavy-handed, so they seem less intrusive.  Further, 
they can be adopted incrementally for purposes that, ostensibly at least, are 
quite benign, and indeed beneficial. 
One of the difficulties in mounting legal arguments against group 
surveillance is the distinction in the United States between the public sector 
and the private sector.  The Constitution places limits only on governmental 
powers.306  Accordingly, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect against 
overreaching by the state.307  When private corporations install cameras and 
“profile” consumers, few Americans perceive an assault on their rights.  We 
have grown accustomed to the presence of hidden cameras in banks and 
convenience stores.  We have adopted the habit of using surveillance as a 
means for social control, to maintain order and to create a sense of safety and 
security on private property.308  One result of this desensitization is that now, 
outside the confines of our own homes, our “expectation of privacy” is almost 
gone. 
However, as I have argued, it is wrong to assume there is a category of 
information about people that is “up for grabs,” to be used by anyone for any 
person.  Philosopher and privacy scholar Helen Nissenbaum calls this the 
problem of “privacy in public.”309  For example, a woman was raped and badly 
beaten in New York’s Central Park in 1989.  The case became famous as a 
racially charged example of prosecutorial misconduct.310  Even though the rape 
occurred in a public place, and the trials of the accused rapists were public 
events, the victim maintained a measure of privacy as to her identity. 311   Even 
in more mundane situations, moreover, there does exist a right to maintain a 
measure of confidentiality in public.  As Nissenbaum points out, for example, 
it is within one’s rights to say “none of your business” to a stranger who asks 
your name, even in a public square or sidewalk.312  
It is equally wrong to say that an aggregation of information violates no 
privacy interest so long as its individual components, taken individually, reveal 
 
 305. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2005). 
 306. See generally U.S. CONST. 
 307. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V. 
 308. See STANLEY & STEINHARDT, supra at note 252, at 1-3. 
 309. Nissenbaum, supra note 227, at 559. 
 310. A Crime Revisited: Excerpts From District Attorney’s Report on Re-examination of 
Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002; Dwyer, J, Likely U-Turn by Prosecutors in Jogger Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, at A1; McFadden, RD, History is Shadow in Present in Jogger Case,  
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at B1; Rashbaum, WK, Convicted Killer and Rapist Says He Attacked 
Central Park Jogger, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at B2. 
 311. The rape victim has subsequently published a book. See TRISHA MELLI, I AM THE 
CENTRAL PARK JOGGER (2003). 
 312. Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of 
Information Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAVIOR 207, 214 (1997). 
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little.  George Kateb makes the case that data mining and video surveillance 
erode our integrity as individuals.313  When the world is divided between those 
who watch and those who are the subject of scrutiny, the watchers are 
empowered, and the people on the wrong end of the camera are stripped of 
dignity: 
[O]ne is insulted, and insulted deeply, because one loses all possibility of 
innocence. . . . . . . . .  [O]ne is crudely treated as interesting and even as 
presumptively or potentially guilty, no matter how law abiding one is. . . .  . . . .  
One is placed under constant suspicion just by being placed under constant 
watchfulness and subjected to the implicit interrogation that exists when the 
accumulated information on oneself is seen as a set of integrated answers that 
add up to a helpless, an unauthored autobiography.  Such a loss of 
innocence . . . . . . . is so massive that the insult involved constitutes an assault 
on the personhood or human status of every individual.314 
The public interest in privacy recognizes that citizens are more than the 
sum of the data elements they disclose to the state.  Just as public surveillance 
constitutes a form of tyranny,315 there is a fundamental privacy violation when 
the government permits or encourages data mining by commercial enterprises. 
V.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
To protect the public interest in privacy, the government must fulfill its 
obligation to safeguard from public access the personal information with which 
it has been entrusted.  Until recently, open government records were difficult 
to access, due to what the Supreme Court called the “practical obscurity” of 
paper storage.316  Finding information about an individual used to involve 
making personal visits to local offices to locate records.  Electronic formats 
and Internet publication have fundamentally changed the relationship between 
individuals, their information, and the government.  The assumptions 
underlying these relationships deserve fresh inquiry, and new policies should 
be adopted to govern these relationships. 317 
A. Open Government Records 
The greatest threat to privacy comes from government in secret.  The best 
way to protect individual privacy is to make the government accountable to its 
 
 313. George Kateb, On Being Watched and Known, 68 SOCIAL RES. 269, 275 (2001). 
 314. Id. at 274-75. 
 315. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 135 (2004). 
 316. U.S. v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989). 
 317. For a work in progress on how to apply the principles of fair information practices to 
commercial data brokers, see Daniel J. Solove & Chris J. Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy 
Protection (Version 1.1), GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 132, Mar. 8, 2005, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=681902. 
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citizens, and open government records statutes serve this purpose.  State 
legislatures should draft open government records statutes to incorporate 
provisions that reveal the inner workings of government and simultaneously 
protect individual privacy: to that end, the following recommendations offer a 
set of policies to be considered and adopted by agencies in the executive and 
legislative branches of government. 
i. Government Agencies Must Notify Individuals That Their Personal 
Information May Be Disclosed to the Public Pursuant to Open Government 
Records Requests.  The first and most important recommendation is to put the 
public on notice that their personal information in government records may be 
disclosed.  Many people are unaware that their personal information may 
become public when they make disclosures for the purpose of doing business 
with state and local government agencies.318  For example, if they have an 
“unlisted” telephone number, they may not expect that their addresses and 
phone numbers will be disclosed pursuant to an open government records 
request.  All governmental agencies should provide notice that information 
may be disclosed. 
ii. Government Agencies Must Limit the Personal Information They Collect 
from Individuals.  Public agencies should only collect the data they need to 
serve their statutorily mandated functions and refrain from collecting 
extraneous personal information.  Indeed, they should be able to identify the 
purposes for which they collect each item of personal information about 
individuals. 
Moreover, state and local government agencies should re-examine the 
information they collect from individuals to determine whether the information 
is relevant and necessary to perform the agencies’ mandated functions.  For 
example, to collect Social Security numbers for fishing licenses may be 
convenient for the agency but serve no essential governmental function; if so, 
the practice should be abolished.  If the personal information is not necessary 
for the agencies’ mandated functions, the agencies should not collect it. 
Government agencies should adopt the principles of fair information 
practices.  There should be a way for an individual to find out what 
information about him is in a record and how it is used.  There should be a way 
for him to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about him.  If a 
public agency collects personal information for one purpose, it should not use 
the information for other purposes or re-disclose the information without 
notice to the affected individuals. 
For most categories of government records, closer study will be required to 
determine whether government agencies should publish personally identifiable 
information.  Vital records, for example, deserve fresh scrutiny.  Records of 
 
 318. Sandra Byrd Peterson, Note, Your Life as an Open Book: Has Technology Rendered 
Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 163, 168-69 (1995). 
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births, deaths, marriages and other vital statistics, long presumed to be public 
records, are now being reconsidered in many jurisdictions, questioning whether 
they are appropriate for Internet publication.319 
Licensing records similarly deserve a fresh look.  Dog licenses, hunting 
and fishing licenses, and many species of permit applications necessarily 
collect home address information.  There may be good reasons to disclose 
home addresses and other particulars about applicants, but none appear at first 
glance.320  The New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs recently stopped 
publishing the home addresses of licensed professionals on its web site, 
although it still discloses addresses of record (including home addresses) upon 
request.321 
State legislatures should consider the following factors to determine 
whether personal information such as home addresses should be exempted 
from government records:  
-  the type of record requested; 
-  the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; 
-  the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was 
generated; 
-  the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; 
-  the degree of need for access; and 
-  whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy 
or other recognizable interest militating toward access.322 
iii.  Public Agencies Should Program Their Computer Systems and 
Applications to Collect But Not Disclose Personal Information.  In the future, 
most requests for government records will likely be answered in electronic 
form, making computer systems and application design a technological answer 
to ensuring that data items like Social Security numbers and home addresses 
are not disclosed when redaction is required.  As new computer systems and 
applications are phased in, they should be designed to flag the data fields for 
personal information and automatically redact this information when required 
to respond to open government records requests. 
 
 319. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:4 (2005) (effective through Jan. 1, 2006 and 
amended by H.R. 383, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2005)) (privacy requirements for vital 
records); CAL. GOVT. CODE § 6254 (West 2005), (exempting vital records from disclosure under 
California Public Records Act). 
 320. Home address and telephone should ordinarily be redacted from disclosures under open 
government records statutes, except in the case of title search records voter registration records, 
and records where disclosure would serve the purpose of shedding light on government.  This will 
not foreclose the news media, professional investigators, or title search companies from obtaining 
residential street addresses.  In order to obtain home address information, requestors may obtain 
common law access to government records. 
 321. See generally New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/ 
home.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2005). 
 322. U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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This will require the state to identify a set of data items to be redacted from 
every record released to the public, such as home address, home telephone 
number, and financial and medical information.  In addition, they must identify 
categories of records to be exempted from public disclosure, such as records 
concerning minor children. 
iv.  Individuals Should Be Permitted to “Opt-Out” of Having Their 
Personal Information Disclosed to the Public Pursuant to Open Government 
Records Requests.  It may be appropriate in some cases to give individuals a 
means to indicate that they do not want their personal information to be 
disclosed to the public.323  For example, they should be permitted in 
appropriate cases to file an “address of record” as an alternative to their home 
address.  In many cases government agencies collect address information from 
residents not for the purpose of establishing residency but for other purposes, 
such as future contact.324  Citizens who do not want their home addresses to be 
disclosed should, in appropriate cases, have the option of providing an address 
of record in lieu of home address. 
v. Legislatures Should Give State and Local Agencies Adequate Funding to 
Comply with Requests for Government Records So As Not to Burden 
Requestors or Records Custodians with the Expense of Redaction and Other 
Requirements.  To redact personal information such as home addresses from 
paper records is very burdensome.  Redaction is labor intensive, time 
consuming, and costly.325  In the future, it should be cheap and easy to 
program government computers so that inappropriate personal information is 
not disclosed electronically.  Most requests for government records will in the 
future probably ask for electronic copies of electronic records.  Many current 
and old records are still on paper, however, and most are archived or difficult 
to access.326  Some requests are for dozens of boxes or thousands of documents 
stored at remote locations or in media that are difficult to retrieve.327 
 
 323. In 1999, for example, Congress amended the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, changing it 
from an “opt-out” law to an “opt-in” law, meaning that state departments of motor vehicles could 
not sell personal data for commercial purposes without the individuals’ consent.  Nevertheless, 
following the June 2000 effective date of the opt-in provision, data brokers continued to purchase 
millions of records from the Florida government for a penny each.  The data brokers knew that 
the law had changed (having lobbied against it), but Fidelity Bank, a Florida savings and loan, 
bought from the Florida DMV names and addresses of individuals who had registered new or 
used cars.  Florida has patched its statute, and Fidelity Bank has been held liable for liquidated 
damages.  Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank and Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 324. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1142-49. 
 325. David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, §§ II-
H, II-I (2005). 
 326. Solove, supra note 1, at 1139. 
 327. See, e.g., Courier Post v. Lenape Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 821 A.2d 1190, 1195-96 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (offering the following factors to be considered to determine whether 
requestors should bear the costs for retrieving and inspecting government records: 1) The volume 
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As a general proposition, the expense of redacting personal information 
should not be borne by requestors but should instead be considered part of the 
cost of providing governmental services.  This proposition places a very 
significant burden on governmental agencies and may be staggering for local 
governments, in staff time, technical equipment, and workspace.  For this 
reason, every government agency should consider and articulate its reasons for 
collecting and disclosing personal information and receive appropriate funding 
support. 
B. Privacy and Fair Information Practices 
In order to adopt statutes that will protect the public interest in individual 
privacy, legislatures will have to identify categories of government records that 
should be kept confidential or from which personal information should be 
redacted.  Some categories of government records clearly belong in the public 
domain, and some categories, just as clearly, do not.  Records custodians need 
clear guidelines to determine whether personal information should be disclosed 
from different categories of records.  Fortunately, legal precedents and many 
current state government resources are available to develop such guidelines.328 
i. Public Domain and Private Information.  It is commonly understood that 
many records are in the public domain – and should be - such as real property 
records.  In many cases, however, citizens give their personal information to 
state and local government agencies expecting that the agencies will not give 
this information to anyone else.329  For many records, like applications for 
fishing licenses and recreational softball leagues, citizens currently expect that 
the government will not publish their home addresses or unlisted telephone 
numbers, much less sensitive personal information. 
Real property records should remain in the public domain.  Generally, 
public agencies should allow access to information where the information is to 
be used for the purposes of facilitating the transfer of title to real property, such 
as title searching, the issuance of title insurance, mortgage origination, and 
other common activities related to the sale and financing of property.  
Government records that contain this information include property deeds, 
mortgages, municipal tax assessment records, tax liens, and judgment liens.330 
 
of government records involved; 2) the period of time over which the records were received by 
the government unit; 3) whether some or all of the records sought are archived; 4) the amount of 
time required for a government employee to locate, retrieve and assemble the documents for 
inspection or copying; 5) the amount of time, if any, required to be expended by government 
employees to monitor the inspection or examination; and 6) the amount of time required to return 
the documents to their original storage space). 
 328. Solove, supra note 1, at 1162-64. 
 329. Id. at 1140; Peterson, supra note 321, at 168-69. 
 330. 329 Solove, supra note 1, at 1145. 
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From other categories of records, by contrast, personal information should 
routinely be withheld from public disclosure.  Such categories include, for 
example, records containing information about minor children and records 
containing medical information, such as municipal recreation department 
records.331 
ii. Definition of “Personal Information.”  To distinguish between records 
that properly belong in the public domain from the confidential data they 
should protect in the interest of privacy, legislatures must define “personal 
information” and charge records custodians with responsibility to ensure that 
personal information is not released to the public.  For example, the Federal 
Privacy Act defines such records as 
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is 
maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial 
transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that 
contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying 
particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a 
photograph.332 
More simply, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
guidelines define “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable individual (data subject).”333 
iii. Specific Privacy Legislation.  The federal government enacted the 
Privacy Act as a companion to the FOIA, and the Supreme Court has 
 
 331. Judicial process will continue to be available, allowing litigants, the press, and other 
interested parties to inspect records that have been closed, especially in cases that involve public 
officials or public figures.  Personal information that is routinely redacted would still be available 
to the public through common law access to government records.  A court should make such a 
determination only after a public hearing of which reasonable notice has been given, and at which 
any interested person has a right to be heard and to contest. 
 332. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (West 2004).  “Personally identifying information” could similarly 
be defined to mean any name, number or other information that may be used, alone or in 
conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual and includes, but is not 
limited to, the name, address, telephone number, date of birth, social security number, official 
state issued identification number, employer or taxpayer number, place of employment, employee 
identification number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card 
number, mother’s maiden name, unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or 
iris image or other unique physical representation, or unique electronic identification number, 
address or routing code of the individual. 
 333. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 
http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_201185_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html; see 
also Declaration on Transborder Data Flows, OECD, Apr. 1985, http://www.oecd.org/ 
documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_201185_1888153_1_1_1_1,00.html.  For a comparison of U.S. 
privacy law to the OECD guidelines, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in 
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 771 (1999). 
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interpreted the statutes together.334  State legislatures could similarly enact 
specific privacy legislation to accompany open government records statutes. 
iv. Omnibus Fair Information Practices Statutes.  Every state in the 
European Union, Canada, and other countries have adopted fair information 
practices statutes.335  This approach is available to the United States as well.  
Such statutes, at a minimum, would require all government agencies to (1) 
compile an index of all databases containing personal information; (2) permit 
individuals access to the non-exempt personal information collected about 
them; and (3) provide individuals the opportunity to verify the accuracy of that 
personal information maintained by the agency.336  
C. Courthouse Records 
The public interest in privacy applies with respect to courthouse records 
just as it applies to government records of the executive branch.  Generally, 
courthouse records fall under the aegis of state supreme courts rather than a 
body of statutes.337  Accordingly, while similar recommendations apply to 
both, the proper domain for codifying rules that apply to courthouse records is 
not legislation but the rules of court.  The following guidelines would serve to 
safeguard the public interest in individual privacy with respect to courthouse 
records. 
i. Redaction. The courts should redact from online records all Social 
Security numbers and other personal information that could facilitate identity 
theft or financial fraud.  This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press: 
[W]e hold as a categorical matter that a third party’s request for law 
enforcement records or information about a private citizen can reasonably be 
expected to invade that citizen’s privacy, and that when the request seeks no 
‘official information’ about a Government agency, but merely records that the 
Government happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is ‘unwarranted.’338 
 
 334. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 490-91 (1994). 
 335. See Canada Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21, §§ 1-2 (1985); OECD Privacy Statement 
Generator (2000), http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_34255_28863271_1_1_  
_1,00.html. 
 336. See Canada Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21, §§ 10, 12 (1985); A few American statutes 
embrace these principles, but cover narrow segments of personal information.  See, e.g., 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (1970) (Fair Credit Reporting Act); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974) (Privacy Act 
of 1974). 
 337. Michael Caughey, Keeping Attorneys from Trashing Identities: Malpractice as a 
Backstop Protection For Clients Under the United States Judicial Conference’s Policy on 
Electronic Court Records, 79 WASH. L. REV. 407, 411 (2004). 
 338. 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989). 
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ii. Limit Commercial Access to Courthouse Records.  No benefit accrues to 
individuals who are forced to disclose information about themselves as a result 
of being hailed into court.339  Litigants, jurors, and witnesses should be entitled 
to a measure of protection, instead of having their personal information mined 
for the commercial benefit of enterprises with which the individuals have no 
relationship. 
The courts may constitutionally require that businesses be explicit about 
what they intend to do with the personal information they obtain from the 
judicial branch.  In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting 
Publishing Corp., for example, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that limited 
commercial access to arrest records.340  The statute permitted public access for 
scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purposes.341  The Court 
concluded that the government may selectively grant access to public record 
information.342  In Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, the Court stated that the 
government may condition the receipt of discovery information on 
nondisclosure.343  Criminal records that merit special protection include 
presentence reports, plea agreements, unexecuted warrants, and pre-indictment 
documents. 
iii. Security.  The judiciary must adopt state-of-the-art security measures to 
prevent hackers and information brokers (including the judiciary’s own 
outsourcing contractors) from culling sensitive information from its electronic 
files. 
iv. Notice to the Public.  The Rules of Court should be amended to account 
for privacy and security.  The courts must put litigants, witnesses, and jurors 
on notice that personal information about them may be sold and/or published 
worldwide on the Internet.  The rules should establish liability and 
consequences for releasing restricted information, as well as remedies for 
providing erroneous or incomplete information derived from court records.344 
v. Acknowledge Individuals.  Privacy protection should extend to persons, 
not corporations.  To a limited extent, anonymity is already permitted: grand 
jury secrecy protects the interests of an innocent accused,345 and some litigants 
 
 339. For this reason, the “information bargain” does not apply to court records, or government 
records of any kind.  That is to say, the benefits that individuals may obtain from supermarket 
discount cards, for example, do not apply to interactions with the government. 
 340. 528 U.S. 32, 34, 41 (1999). 
 341. Id. at 35. 
 342. Id. at 41. 
 343. Id. 
 344. The rules should also provide remedies and consequences for improperly withholding 
public information. 
 345. See, e.g., Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979). 
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(such as rape victims and minors) are permitted to use their initials only.346  
The principles that protect the privacy interests of individuals who must 
participate in the court system should extend to electronic court records. 
vi. Limit Fees.  Court records should not be sold to generate revenue for 
the judicial branch.  In this country, personally identifiable information is 
treated as a commodity, and the data-mining industry generates substantial 
revenues.347  The judiciary could easily sell court records for profit to 
companies that collect information to do background checks and the like.  This 
would be highly inappropriate.  The courts are created to serve the entire 
population of the state.  Their costs should not be borne exclusively by 
litigants, witnesses, and others who have involuntarily come into contact with 
the justice system. 
Release of information on computer tape in many instances is far more 
revealing than release of hard copies, and offers the potential for far more 
intrusive inspections.  Unlike paper records, computerized records can be 
rapidly retrieved, searched, and reassembled in novel and unique ways, not 
previously imagined.  For example, doctors can search for medical-malpractice 
claims to avoid treating litigious patients; employers can search for workers-
compensation claims to avoid hiring those who have previously filed such 
claims; and credit companies can search for outstanding judgments and other 
financial data.  Thus, the form in which information is disseminated can be a 
factor in the use of and access to records.348 
CONCLUSION 
Congress, state legislatures, and the judiciary must empower federal, state, 
and local government agencies to protect the public interest in privacy and 
thereby fulfill their constitutional and statutory obligations.  State and local 
government agencies should evaluate and articulate their reasons for collecting 
individually identifiable information about citizens. 
In some instances, government agencies need information about 
individuals in order to provide services to those individuals.  In such cases, 
disclosures about the individuals will reveal nothing about governmental 
 
 346. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527 n.2 (1989) (noting that the court would 
use the rape victims initials for privacy interests); J.K. v. Kucharski, 661 N.W.2d  216 (Mich. 
2003) (using a minor’s initials in a termination of parental rights case); State ex rel. T.W. v. 
Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d 41, 42 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (using a minor’s initials in a termination of 
parental rights case). 
 347. See Solove, supra note 1, at 1149-51. 
 348. Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 660 A.2d 1163, 1172 (N.J. 1995). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] PERSONAL INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT RECORDS 121 
operations.  Accordingly, in those instances, personally identifiable 
information should not be routinely disclosed.349 
The public interest in privacy similarly attaches to court records.  The 
judiciary should not yield to the demands of profit or even of tradition without 
a fresh evaluation of its obligation to protect the personal information it has 
obtained from individuals who are under compulsion to the system. 
 
 349. In other cases, the information may be gathered for the purpose of evaluating 
governmental operations, and disclosure would be appropriate.  See U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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